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ABSTRACT 
 
Listening to music has never been easier. Now, everything is just a fingertip away. From 
mainstream hits to niche productions, all we need to do is log on to a music streaming service 
like Spotify. Even better, we do not need to pay a single penny! If we want more access and 
options, we can pay for premium service with a monthly subscription fee as low as 99 
Norwegian crowns or USD $9.99, depending on where you are located. This new music 
consumption method has become so popular that it has turned the tide of the long recession in 
the music industry, and now “accounts for 50% of total recorded music revenues” (IFPI, 2017, 
p. 10). However, the music industry is also not short of complaints from recording artists who 
argue they are not getting paid enough from music streaming. This contradictory phenomenon 
has sparked a huge discourse in the music industry, and I am here to trace the artists’ shrinking 
revenue stream.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2014, music lovers were devastated after pop star Taylor Swift decided not to release her 
album “1989” on Spotify. (Engel, 2014) The news shocked many; no one would have guessed 
a superstar like her would snub the highly regarded music streaming service. To add insult to 
injury, she also withdrew the rest of her music that was previously available on Spotify. 
Defending her move,  Swift called Spotify a ‘grand experiment’ that did not “fairly compensate 
the writers, producers, artists and creators of [the] music” (Grow, 2014). Her dissatisfaction 
over Spotify stemmed mainly from the fact that many users could listen to her music for free, 
“perpetuating the perception that music has no value” (Grow, 2014). Has music streaming 
really affected the revenue of artists? Or was Swift merely pulling a marketing stunt? 
 
On closer look, it is relatively harder now for artists to be dependent on music streaming as 
their main source of income. According to a comprehensive breakdown collated by 
informationisbeautiful.net (2015), an artist would have to get a song streamed more than a 
million times to earn the standard United States monthly minimum wage of USD $1,260. In 
contrast, the same artist could easily achieve the same figure by selling not more than 200 
physical albums. And if the artist chooses to distribute the music privately, a little more than a 
hundred would suffice.  
 
Due to the nature of the distribution, music streaming is unable to provide a high payout, 
compared with physical distribution. Instead of selling a physical product to consumers, music 
streaming services sell their users access to music. Because of that, a different revenue system 
is employed. In most cases, it is less direct and every single transaction is in a small decimal 
figure. An anonymous band revealed their royalties from Spotify dating from 2013 February 
15 to 2013 October 15, and it showed that the average per stream payout they received was 
USD $0.004891 (Resnikoff, 2016). Taking that into account, I begin to question why the 
margin in music streaming is so low, and if that is a genuinely fair compensation from the 
service provider.  
 
Without a doubt, music streaming has shown promising results in recent years. By 2015, it 
accounted for 43 per cent of the overall digital sales and a record 93 per cent increment in the 
United States (IFPI, 2016, p. 4). According to the Year-End Revenue and Shipment Reports of 
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the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), the music industry is officially making 
money on music streaming (Shaw, 2016).That said, it is alarming that artists are not making 
more money, even as the industry is benefiting from music streaming. This paradox has left 
me with a lot of questions and as part of the growing music streaming community, I am 
determined to find out the truth about this unexplained phenomenon. With an aim to allocate 
the missing revenue in music streaming, my research thesis will set out to answer: How does 
the growth of music streaming affect the revenue of artists? If the music industry is really 
making money from streaming, where has the money gone? Has the missing revenue gone into 
the ‘black box’? And most importantly, are there any solutions?  
 
1.1 WHY MUSIC STREAMING?  
 
To help me understand how digital service providers (DSPs) like Spotify became so prominent 
in the music industry, I would need to go back to the start of music digitization. It all started in 
the late 20th century with the creation of the MP3 file. A group of scientists from The German 
Fraunhofer1 laboratories found a way to compress a music file into a fraction of its original 
size. Given the small file size, music can now be uploaded and downloaded via the interne, 
even with a slow connection. In its digital form, music consumption is not limited to physical 
copies anymore, and has transformed into an information good (Frith & Marshall, 2004). In 
other words, it is non-exclusive; everyone can access the music with or without a physical 
copy; music can be consumed repetitively and simultaneously by different persons.  
 
Digitization made music sharing easy – and free – but this presents a huge problem for the 
music industry. Consumers have come to see music as free goods and have little compunction 
about downloading and sharing digital files (Menell P. S., 2014; Hardy, 2012). While gathering 
their favourite tunes from the famous peer-to-peer (P2P) platform Napster, consumers had no 
idea they were committing online piracy. They were simply applying the same ideology of 
‘loaning’ a copy of music to their friends, but in the digital realm. Nonetheless, the act of 
sharing music without proper consent from the rights holders has created mayhem in the music 
industry. Firstly, the sales of music recordings plummeted as consumers opted to download 
                                                   
1 The Fraunhofer Society is a German research organization with 67 institutes spread 
throughout Germany, each focusing on different fields of applied science. (Source: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fraunhofer_Society)  
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their music for free. Second, music labels and publishers were in trouble because none of the 
existing solutions could work efficiently. In the United States for example, the No Electronic 
Theft (NET) Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) were enacted by 
Congress long before online piracy was widespread, yet that did not prevent the public from 
doing so. Because the administration fees of ensnaring piracy offenders from the internet were 
rather costly (Menell P. S., 2014, pp. 224-227), it became difficult for the law enforcer to 
oversee the vast internet users. And most importantly, the rights holders would not benefit from 
the penalties that would be issued to the offenders (Menell P. S., 2014, p. 230). With fire 
burning from both ends, the music industry shifted their focus from physical distribution to 
digital distribution. 
 
Diverting music distribution to the internet has proven to be a great challenge for the major 
music labels, because they have invested a lot of time and money in the offline production 
chain. Over the years, major labels have vertically integrated with pressing and distribution 
facilities to reduce their financial risks. However, streamlining the production process has 
become a ‘strategic handicap’ (Moreau F. , 2013, p. 22) when disruptive technology like music 
digitization was introduced. From an economical standpoint, it would be a bad decision for the 
major labels to change their distribution method if the transition would put a toll on their assets. 
Their facilities in the production line would become irrelevant to digital distribution, thus 
losing value and turning into negative equity. Even though the major labels attempted to launch 
their own online music stores before Napster’s emergence, “their efforts lacked the variety, 
functionality, and flexibility of peer-to-peer networks” (Menell P. S., 2014, p. 220). In the 
midst of looking for a better solution, DSPs like Amazon and iTunes became the intermediaries 
for the labels to distribute their music digitally.   
 
Still, the idea of getting music for free has become deeply rooted among consumers and they 
no longer know what is a fair price to pay for music (Elberse, 2014). Despite the availability 
of legal digital downloads, the music industry had to compete with free music that could be 
found in P2P sharing (The Kristiansand Roundtable Conference, 2016; Wikström & DeFillippi, 
2016). In response, a new business model made its first appearance in the music streaming 
platform Spotify in October 2008 (spotifysher & The Spotify Team, 2008). Under this model, 
users have the option to sign up for a free account with some restrictions, or a premium account 
with upgrades; hence the term ‘Freemium’ (Wikström, 2013, p. 110). Free account users can 
enjoy their music for free, and their supposed subscription fees will be offset by advertising 
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revenue from third parties. On the other hand, premium users would have to pay a monthly 
subscription fee in return for customisation not available to free users. With this ‘Freemium’ 
arrangement, consuming music through a legal channel has become appealing to consumers 
once again, because ‘virtually’ free (Moreau F. , 2013, p. 27) music has finally been made 
available to the public on a legal platform. 
 
1.2 MAKING MONEY FROM FREE MUSIC 
  
The introduction of on-demand, subscription-based streaming services proved to be the 
antidote for the long recession in the music industry. Co-founder and CEO of Spotify, Daniel 
Ek, expressed that “after years and years of decline, music is growing again, streaming is 
behind the growth in music, and Spotify is behind the growth in streaming” (Ek, 2016). There 
was an implicit theory that ‘Freemium’ would encourage free users to sign up for the premium 
service, therefore reviving the practice of paying for music (Wikström, 2013; Wikström & 
DeFillippi, 2016). Based on recent statistics, the theory might hold water because 40 to 60 per 
cent of free users would eventually upgrade their account after their free trial period (Byrne, 
2015). In fact, premium subscribers in Spotify have risen and contributed to 90.9 per cent of 
its total revenue by 2013 (Peoples, 2014). 
 
Evidently, music streaming has become one of the most important distribution channels, but 
problems have started to emerge, and questions about its sustainability have become a popular 
topic. One of the top concerns is that artists are not making as much money as they used to. 
Many artists are questioning whether they are getting their fair pay, and how cheap their music 
would need to be in order to be ‘virtually’ free for consumers. A similar question was brought 
up to Daniel Ek during the Vanity Fair Summit, and this was his answer:  
 
 
 
 
There were a lot of artists that didn’t understand streaming [whether] was it 
good, was it bad for them. And, Spotify quite quickly started becoming the 
biggest music service and right now we are about 70 percent of all revenues 
in Sweden including physical as well. So this is a massive part in the music 
industry has actually gone up in revenues. But the biggest [issue] that 
happened during the process is transparency, so we started showing actually 
how many streams the artists had. And as a consequence, they started asking 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judging from Ek’s reply, he seems convinced that the source of the problem did not come from 
the streaming service itself, but from the process of revenue distribution. He also pointed out 
the lack of transparency between the labels and artists, and that they have been providing the 
artists with a better understanding of what they were actually earning in case of royalty 
discrepancy. Nevertheless, knowing how much the music is worth in streaming services does 
not solve the transparency issue. It was just scratching the tip of the iceberg because the value 
of the music is determined by other factors that are beyond the control of the artists themselves. 
As Peter Menell (2014, pp. 253-254) puts it, artists in the Internet Age are being caught in a 
dual-clamping vice by two powerful and determined forces. Consumers are getting more 
reluctant to spend on music, and labels need to maximize their profits under such circumstance. 
Being sandwiched by these uncompromising parties, artists have become the target of 
exploitation, resulting in their shrinking revenues.  
 
Making money from free music may be a ridiculous idea, but it has been done at the expense 
of the artists. This irrational act is sabotaging the artists and failing to provide economic 
sustainability across the entire revenue chain. Even well established artists like Prince (Davis, 
2016), Taylor Swift (2015), David Byrne (2015), and Billy Bragg (2014) have raised their 
concerns about music streaming, yet the industry is slow to respond to their protests. In the 
following chapter, I will try to identify the source of the problems and find out what contributed 
to the transparency issue. And by doing so, I could narrow down what I should be focusing on 
in my research to explore the possible solutions to this critical issue. 
 
  
the labels…what is that mean? How much will actually go out? […] Today, 
we have an artist website where we say roughly how much a thousand 
streams or a million streams actually mean in terms of dollars back to artists. 
But because of how we published that, that started creating a dialogue 
between the artists and the industry. And as a side consequence, because 
streaming has become such a massive part of the revenues, labels even 
changed how they started paying out the artists. So they started paying out 
instead of once a year, [they] started paying out…more frequent. (Vanity 
Fair, 2014) 
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2. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS 
 
In a nutshell, the music industry has morphed from a high margin, low complexity industry 
into a low margin, high complexity industry (Nauman, 2016, p. 2). This idea was first coined 
by Vickie Nauman, who said the situation was irreversible, comparing it to “toothpaste out of 
the tube” (Nauman, 2016, p. 2). Before digitization, sound recordings were sold in physical 
copies that were ‘rights ready’ (Cooke, 2015, p. 10). They consisted of the respective rights 
clearance for private consumption, and the splits of the revenue were finalized prior to 
distribution. So whenever a purchase was made, the buyer was paying for the rights to consume 
the music from a physical copy. Since each copy consisted of 12 songs on average, the unit 
price is correspondingly higher and the rights holders could enjoy more payout. It was a very 
straightforward business model that allowed few mistakes and little confusion. The revenue 
stream was more transparent and artists had a higher revenue margin in general. 
 
2.1 NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT  
 
Music streaming operates in a very different way compared to the old business model. Since 
music streaming services do not get their music from individual albums, they would need to 
seek the copyright clearance from the labels and publishers separately. During the process of 
negotiation, they will enter an agreement which is commonly known as the Non-Disclosure 
Agreement (NDA), where the contents of the agreement are kept secret. Once the agreement 
has been finalised, they will gain access to the catalogue of music from the respective labels. 
As simple as it might sound, the NDA is the key reason why music streaming is so complicated. 
 
First of all, “copyright law does not usually seek to regulate the specifics of assignment or 
licensing agreements, or how the ownership and control of individual copyrights is divided and 
transferred” (Cooke, 2015, p. 26). Meaning, copyright law is flexible and there is no existing 
template for standard artist contracts or NDAs. As long as the terms were agreed on between 
the signees, the contract or agreement will take effect immediately. In such circumstances, 
some might take advantage of the artists by “twisting the rules” or “playing the system” 
(Cooke, 2015, p. 22) to lessen their artists’ royalties payout. In the worst case scenario, some 
artists get nothing out of their music.  
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An excerpt of Lady Gaga’s contract with Interscope Records was leaked on the internet in 
2014. In that contract, it is stated that “Interscope will not pay anything to Lady Gaga on 
licensing deals that involve the entire label catalogue” (Resnikoff, 2014). Under this 
arrangement, Interscope would absorb all the royalties from music streaming services that 
supposedly belonged to Lady Gaga. This bizarre incident was later confirmed by Troy Carter, 
Lady Gaga’s ex-manager. He lamented, “Spotify is paying out a lot of money, it’s just not 
finding its way into the hands of the artists” (Resnikoff, 2015). Although the flexibility of 
copyright law has provided a safe ground for business partners to customize their agreements, 
the absence of governance has increased the complexity of contracts and agreements without 
limitation, handicapping the artists. 
 
Second, the lack of transparency in NDAs has limited the access of information with regards 
to the share arrangement and rights allocation. Despite being beneficiaries in the NDAs, neither 
artists nor their managers would have access to the agreements made between their labels and 
DSPs (Cooke, 2015 & 2016). With little knowledge about the agreement, artists are not able to 
find out what they are actually making from music streaming. In relation to the previous case 
study, this might explain why Lady Gaga and Troy Carter were not aware of their ill-treatment 
under their label. Based on a survey conducted by the Music Managers Forum, 57% of the 
managers are not sure what is the share arrangement made between the labels and DSPs 
(Cooke, 2015, p. 49). Furthermore, 67 per cent of them do not know what is the agreed 
minimum payments for their artists. There are too many uncertainties caused by the NDAs, 
and “some managers also felt that some labels and publishers	may be benefiting from the lack 
of transparency financially” (Cooke, 2016, p. 10). As artists and managers have run out of 
solutions to ratify their revenue stream, the complexity brought by the NDAs remains. 
 
Finally, the practice of advance payment and breakage in the NDAs are unjustifiable. DSPs 
like Spotify have paid USD $500 million upfront to the labels before they can acquire the 
licenses to the music catalogues. Nonetheless, there is a possibility that “part of the money 
might have ended up in the proverbial ‘black box’ ” (Menell P. S., 2014, p. 260). Theoretically, 
these upfront advances are recoupable by Spotify within a set period of time, but they will 
become non-refundable if the total revenues did not exceed the revenue share or guaranteed 
minimum royalties promised to the labels (Cooke, 2016, p. 56). So if the advance for the year 
is $1 million, and the music catalogue only managed to generate $700,000, which is below the 
revenue share or minimum royalties, the label would get to pocket the rest of the advance.  
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It is up to the goodwill of the labels to share the ‘extra’ revenue with their artists or not, though 
very likely the money will be categorised as ‘unallocated advance’ or ‘black box money’ and 
absorbed by the labels themselves. Taking this into consideration, the labels are making 
additional revenue by commodifying music created by their artists, yet the latter could not get 
a share of the pie. Moreover, advances demanded by the labels are gradually increasing. “A 
leaked Sony Music deal with Spotify in the US provided a $9 million advance in year one, $16 
million in year two, and $17.5 million in an optional third year” (Cooke, 2015, p. 62). These 
ascending numbers are slowly pushing the envelope and from a deeper analysis done by 
blogger Mark Mulligan, Spotify had paid out 82 percent of their total revenues in 2015 due to 
the advance payments to the labels (Mulligan, 2016); that was 12 per cent higher compared to 
their then 70/30 split projection.  
 
Within the advances, labels will generally apply 20 per cent deduction on the revenue before 
an artist’s royalty is calculated (Cooke, 2016, pp. 37-38). This is an old practice from the 
heyday of vinyl records, where damage on the records happened frequently during the 
production and distribution process. Vinyl records broke because they were made of a thin 
layer of resin composite. Therefore, the labels would make a deduction from the artist’s 
revenue as a safety net, and the name ‘breakage’ was given to this deduction. In spite of its 
origin, ‘breakage’ fees are still applicable in the digital realm. The labels argue that they are 
still taking risks while producing and distributing the music, much like what happened in 
physical releases (Cooke, 2016, p. 6). Even so, artists have questioned how the labels came up 
with the figure of 20 per cent. 
 
To retrieve the revenue, artists have to go through a series of obstacles. The flexibility of 
copyright law, transparency issues in the licensing deals, unallocated advances and breakages 
have created a multi-layer barrier, where each element will lower the revenue of the artists. 
When the problem of the low margin is being raised to the DSPs, the question will be diverted 
back to the transparency of the structure in music streaming deals (Vanity Fair, 2014). 
Obviously, the DSPs have tried their best to provide a greater payout – seemingly, the total 
payout has spiked up to 80 per cent on average. Borrowing a personal quote from an 
anonymous executive at a DSP, “70% is tough enough, but at 80%, we would have to shut up 
shop. Somebody should explain that 80% of nothing is... nothing” (Cooke, 2016, p. 29). 
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2.2 LOSS OF DATA 
 
In light of the transparency issue the loss of information to the rights holders has become a 
common thread in the music streaming business. Pelle Snickars explained music had turned 
into a data-driven communication form in digital distribution (Wikström & DeFillippi, 2016, 
pp. 193-194). Instead of sound waves and musical notes, the computer reads music as bits and 
bytes (Manovich, 2013). It will not comprehend or distinguish the differences between the 
same song but different singers, or different songs but the same singer. The only way to help 
the internet and computer understand the differences is by providing data corresponding to the 
music that is being played (Wikström & DeFillippi, 2016; McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2014). 
Since then, the data of the music has become very important because music does not come 
‘rights ready’ anymore. Besides, music data are not always available to the public. Some labels 
and collective management organizations (CMOs) tend to keep part or all of the rights holders’ 
data confidential (Gervais, 2010, p. 8). By doing so, only the specific party would have the 
accurate information and it will compromise the revenue stream of the artists.  
  
Nauman (2016) gave a very good example of how loss of data would create problems in the 
revenue stream. Imagine the revenue distribution process from the DSPs to the artists is like 
carrying a bucket full of water from Point A to Point B. In the midst of delivering the water, 
the bucket started to leak because it has holes all over. The holes represent the loss of data, 
hence by the time the water arrived at Point B, the bucket would be half full or maybe empty. 
Similarly, if the data of the music is incomplete or missing, artists will be receiving only part 
of their revenue, but never the full amount. On top of that, not all royalty distribution is 
possible. In the setting of cross border distribution, CMOs are unable to deliver the revenue to 
foreign countries if the involved countries do not have a reciprocal agreement with them 
(Gervais, 2010; Cooke, 2015; Cooke, 2016).  Combining these factors together, we have a 
nightmare for revenue distribution. 
 
Without a complete, accurate and unified database, royalties will often be trapped within the 
CMOs. This sum of royalties will be doomed as ‘unallocated revenues’ or ‘black box money’ 
because the system is unable to identify who is the correct rights holder. According to the 
Chairman of TONO, Bendik Hofseth, most of the ‘unallocated revenues’ are related to the 
conflict of data. Whenever there is a disagreement on the splits of revenue or multiple claims 
on ownership, TONO is not able to resolve the problem because they do not have a genuine 
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and accurate source to rectify with. As a consequence, the revenue will stay inside the CMO 
until the rights holders could come to an agreement. Otherwise, after a set period of time when 
the revenue remains unclaimed, the CMO is entitled to absorb and repurpose the revenue.  
 
It is getting clearer that music streaming has a huge impact on the artist’s revenue stream, but 
mainly the negative effect is greater than the positive. Daniel Nordgård pointed out that the 
debates over “evaporating royalty pay-outs and […] the streaming format’s economic 
sustainability” (Wikström & DeFillippi, 2016, p. 175) have become increasingly popular 
amongst artists nowadays. Regardless of the growth in the music industry or the higher overall 
payout from the DSPs, artists are not able to get a taste of the pie. Whilst focusing on the flaws 
of the copyright law and the dysfunctional system, another issue regarding the payment method 
might shed light on the problems of music streaming too. 
 
2.3 PRO-RATA 
 
Today, many of us live in a society of abundance. There are endless supplies of food, water, 
energy, information and other necessities. Products are readily purchased online and offline, 
and we can even have them delivered to our doorstep. However, the fact that we will never run 
out of options has become a huge dilemma for some of us. Barry Schwartz (2005) has written 
a book called “The Paradox of Choice” to illustrate how the culture of abundance has 
transformed our consumption behaviour. He realised that in modern days, “consumers tend to 
return to the products they usually buy, not even noticing 75% of the items competing for the 
attention and their dollars” (Schwartz B. , 2005, p. 12). In other words, three quarters of the 
products in the market will very likely be ignored by the consumers. Consumers developed this 
behaviour because it has become natural to “reduce the time and energy, as well as the number 
of processes [they] have to engage” (Schwartz B. , 2005, p. 23), when there are so many 
varieties to choose from.  
 
The paradox of choice is also applicable to the music streaming business. There are 20,000 
new tracks added to Spotify daily and to date, they have accumulated a humongous catalogue 
of music, not lesser than 30 million songs (Wikström & DeFillippi, 2016, p. 196). Using the 
estimation projected by Schwartz, only 7.5 million songs will be played by users. While the 
rest of the songs are buried at the bottom of the catalogue, the top 7.5 million songs would 
possibly be the international hits from superstar artists. This is a known fact throughout the 
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music or entertainment industry – that in a highly competitive market, only the crème de la 
crème will succeed. When consumers have so little to spend, they “will always spend on the 
superstar although the musical advantage is little” (Elberse, 2014). The ‘Superstar Effect’ has 
been widely discussed by scholars and analysts (Elberse, 2014; Mulligan, 2014; McAfee & 
Brynjolfsson, 2014; Krueger, 2005), and the result seems to be heightened in the digital age.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, there is the sub-genre music which is mainly produced by 
indie labels (Moreau F. , 2013). This group of niche music falls under the ‘long tail’, which 
Chris Anderson described as non-mainstream music that will eventually find their audience in 
the never-ending market; “even if it’s just a handful of people every month, somewhere in the 
world” (Anderson, 2006, p. 22). Among this handful of listeners, there are some of the heaviest 
consumers (Elberse, 2014). They could be listening to a very specific niche band most of the 
time, even if they have other options. Theoretically, the niche band will be receiving all or most 
of the revenue generated by their diehard fans, but due to the pro-rata payment system, the 
band will be paid otherwise. 
 
Pro-rata is a revenue allocation model based on how often a song is streamed, compared to the 
overall streams in a DSP. This ‘proportionate allocation’ method focuses on the contribution 
of each individual consumption, and it is biased towards ‘quantitative listening’ (Maasø, 2014). 
If the niche band’s music only contributed to one percent of the streams, they will only get one 
percent of the revenue generated through their fans. The rest of the 99 percent of the revenues 
will be channelled to other artists whom the fans may have not heard of. This system has a 
profound impact on smaller artists that have a limited audience, because their music will not 
have enough shares to achieve a sustainable income via DSPs. International superstars will 
always be the dominant shareholders, since it is a global market on music streaming.  
 
Based on a research conducted by Nordgård, the Norwegian local repertoire share in the overall 
sales has dropped significantly from “22-30 per cent in the CD era (between 2007 and 2009, 
the Norwegian local share reached 40-50 per cent), while today it hovers around 10-12 per 
cent” (Wikström & DeFillippi, 2016, p. 177). With an immense supply of music and 
competition from international hits, the average local artists will struggle to breakthrough in 
this diluted market. Following the logic of ‘winner-takes-all’ (Elberse, Blockbusters, 2014; 
McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2014) where the superstars will get the biggest share (if not all) of the 
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revenue, it is easy to see why the growth of music streaming will not benefit the majority of 
the artists. 
 
2.4 ‘BLACK BOX MONEY’ 
 
In the digital age, “rapid and accelerating digitization is likely to bring economic rather than 
environmental disruption” (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2014, p. 22) to the music industry. I have 
listed some examples of the aftermath, and the root of the problems could be summarized as a 
lack of governance in copyright law; no access to a unified database; and top-heavy revenue 
distribution (Wikström & DeFillippi, 2016). If these issues are left unchecked, the economic 
gain of producing music will literally become running water, as predicted by David Bowie 
(Frith, 2007; Krueger, 2005). The late pop legend had suggested that hosting tours and live 
performances could be the answer to getting alternative incomes, but in reality, not all 
recording artists are popular enough to do so. Producing and selling music remains the main 
source of revenue for most artists, particularly for the budding ones. For the sake of making it 
in the music industry, a lot of them have chosen to offer ‘free labour’, and ‘self-exploitation’ 
is seen as a ticket to a brighter future (Hesmondhalgh, 2016). So, despite the low margin in 
music streaming, a lot of the artists see it as a platform to share their music with the public. 
 
There is no reason to stop asking the question why artists are not getting enough pay if the 
industry is making money from music streaming. Setting the pro-rata distribution aside, why 
should artists tolerate with incompetency of the operating system in the digital market, and 
watch their potential earnings get washed into the ‘black box’. I want to challenge the taboo of 
speaking up about ‘black box money’, even “it's a sore and sensitive point that few people dare 
speak about” (Lindvall, 2008).  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
David Byrne suggested that record labels were making ‘black box money’ from the advances 
they get “from the streaming services, catalogue service payments for old songs and equity in 
the streaming services themselves” (Byrne, 2015). However, his debate only offered a single-
dimension observation from the perspective of an artist, which conflicted with other studies 
offered by various analysts such as Ethan Smith, Los Angeles Bureau Chief from The Wall 
Street Journal. Conversely, he expressed that “the ‘black box’ comes into the picture when 
there isn’t a clear path for royalties to flow from one country to another” (Smith, 2011). His 
theory, on the contrary, was primarily based on the royalty transactions from CMOs to CMOs, 
and it scored a contrasting point-of-view in comparison with the one Byrne had mentioned 
earlier. While one of them narrowed down the source of the problem to the ill working etiquette 
practiced by record labels, the latter discourse focused on a technical issue in cross border 
revenue allocation conducted by CMOs. Despite the differences, they were referring to the 
same subject – the ‘black box’. Their interpretation on the same subject varied greatly due to 
their perceptions on the matter, and inasmuch as they were trying to make sense of a subject 
that was incomplete, cloudy, contradictory or unclear (Taylor C. , 1971, p. 3)  
 
People fear talking about the ‘black box’ because it was a sensitive issue to be discussed in 
public. Hence, it remained an illusive and confusing topic to tackle. As for those who have 
voiced their opinions, they had made very little impact thus far because their arguments lacked 
hermeneutical backing. In reality, people who attempt to identify a problem will unavoidably 
dive into an area where the prevailing epistemological prejudice might blind them to the nature 
of their object of study (Taylor C. , 1971, p. 5). Artists will more likely anchor their interest on 
their low payout with ‘black box money; business analysts will generally look into technical 
issues and vice versa. That said, the existing interpretation of the ‘black box’ has failed to 
justify its meaning. To articulate a true ‘meaning’ in the social research context, Charles 
Taylor, author of ‘Interpretation and the Science of Man’, emphasized that it had to fulfil three 
elements. First, ‘meaning’ is for a subject; e.g: the ‘black box’. Second, ‘meaning’ is of 
something; e.g: missing revenues from the artists. Third, things only have ‘meaning’ in a field 
in relation to other things; e.g: how ‘black box’ would relate and change according to other 
elements in the music industry (Taylor C. , 1971, p. 11). Noticeably, the current interpretations 
of ‘black box’ have not been able to put up a structural illustration on how it could relate to 
other key elements in the music industry. There were plenty of examples on the fact that the 
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artists’ revenue margin was getting lower, but there was nothing about the dynamics of its 
existence with other components such as the copyright law, business practices, etc. Bearing 
that in mind, I have decided to take the qualitative approach to make sense of the ‘black box’.  
 
Qualitative research is known to allow researchers to gain greater focus on an in-depth study, 
and its ‘thick descriptions’ based data is most suitable to rectify “intricacies of a situation and 
do justice to the subtleties” (Denscombe, 2010, p. 304) of the subject. I have gotten the big 
picture of the ‘black box’ now, but I am still missing its details. The music industry is making 
more and more money, and there is no short of statistical evidence showing their turnover every 
year. However, the how’s and why’s of the ‘black box’ remain as untold stories. With the 
suitable research approach in place, I hope to shed light on my research questions more 
efficiently. 
  
3.1 CASE STUDY ON THE ‘BLACK BOX’ 
 
Given the assumption that social “realities are wholes that cannot be understood in isolation 
from their contexts, nor can they be fragmented for separate study of their parts” (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985, p. 39), to realize the true ‘meaning’ of ‘black box’ requires a rather holistic 
approach. Dealing purely with isolated factors will not work well in this circumstance, since 
the ‘black box’ is an unclear social phenomenon that lacks sound interpretation. As a solution 
to gather more in depth information on the subject, case study strategy offers a look “into 
sufficient detail to unravel the complexities of a given situation” (Denscombe, 2010, p. 53). 
The core of this research strategy covers a wide spectrum of analytical practices, where “it 
allows the researcher to use a variety of sources, a variety of types of data and a variety of 
research methods as part of the investigation” (Denscombe, 2010, p. 54).  
 
Without the textbook limitation on the research methods, I could easily formulate my own 
combination of methods that would work best to accommodate the sparse research materials 
that I could gather. The scarcity of creditable articles on the ‘black box’ issue troubled me at 
first because I thought it would diminish the calibre of my research outcome. But now, I could 
use it to my advantage to fabricate “a concentrated analysis that facilitates the recognition of 
specific details that often get overlooked by other scientific approaches” (Nordgård, 2016a). 
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3.2 OBSERVATION WITH SUPPORTING DOCUMENT 
 
First and foremost, the ‘black box’ is an ongoing issue and there are many voices in the music 
industry who claim their arguments are more ‘legit’ than the others. It is akin to a chicken-and-
egg situation, where each party holds strong to their opinion but neither of them is able to prove 
they have the ultimate answer. Furthermore, it is very hard to find a common ground to discuss 
the ‘black box’ issue because not all of the individuals share the same interest in the production 
of music. As I have mentioned earlier, when one is trying to resolve something that is unclear, 
there is a huge possibility that the person will be blinded by his/her prejudice towards that 
matter. To prevent a similar influence on judgement that could happen to my research, I will 
begin my case study starting from observation on music roundtables “to understand the culture 
and processes” (Denscombe, 2010, p. 197) in intimate detail directly from the professionals in 
the music industry. Importantly, observation is not based on the premise of “what people say 
they do, or what they say they think. […] Instead, it draws on the direct evidence of the eye to 
witness events at first hand” (Denscombe, 2010, p. 196).  In that manner, I would be able to 
harness the basis of the argument in its rawest form, and start to build up my own interpretation 
by relating it with other factors.  
 
3.2.1 THE KRISTIANSAND ROUNDTABLE CONFERENCE 
 
The music roundtable that I would like to discuss in my observation is The Kristiansand 
Roundtable Conference. I first chanced upon The Kristiansand Roundtable Conference in 
2015, when it was introduced to me by one of the co-founders, Daniel Nordgård. It was an 
‘invites-only’ conference based in Kristiansand, Norway, and funded by the University of 
Agder. They kickstarted their first conference back in 2007, and their aim is “to facilitate a 
dialogue for progress in an industry that has been undergoing considerable technological and 
legal challenges, while providing potential for discussing the future shape of the industry” 
(Nordgård, 2016b). Throughout their instalments, they have invited some of the most important 
figures from the music industry, including the chiefs of major labels and CMOs. With great 
honour, I was asked to be an observer in 2016, and in time I took that same opportunity to pen 
down my first observation research.  
 
As Denscombe has pointed out, the disadvantage of participant observation is that it “relies so 
crucially on the researcher’s ‘self’ as the instrument of research, it becomes exceedingly 
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difficult to repeat a study to check for reliability” (Denscombe, 2010, p. 214). Even though the 
two-day event was a fruitful experience for me, I realized my field note has not been able to 
transpire some of the information that I have observed during the conference. So, to reaffirm 
that what I have learnt from The Kristiansand Roundtable Conference was accurate, I would 
use the recommendation mentioned by Denscombe – combining observations of events within 
the case study with the documents from official meetings (Denscombe, 2010, p. 54). In this 
case, I will draw on the roundtable reports from the Music Managers Forum (MMF) to fortify 
my findings.  
 
3.2.2 MUSIC MANAGERS FORUM 
 
The MMF is a professional community of music managers from the UK established in 1992. 
They pride themselves on providing education and information to assist their members and 
music managers alike. They also work to promote a fair and transparent business environment 
in the digital market, and seek to unify the voices of their members. As part of their vision, 
they have commissioned CMU Insights2 to come up with a report to put their debate about 
music streaming into words so they could have a better grasp on this trending issue. Co-founder 
and Business Editor of CMU Insights, Chris Cooke, took on this project and produced a two-
part report named “Dissecting the Digital Dollar”. This report comprises reviews and feedback 
from “30 leading practitioners from across the music, digital and legal sectors, and [survey 
from] 50 artist managers in five markets who, between them, represent artists signed to all three 
major music companies and over 100 independent labels” (Cooke, 2015). With this pool of 
constructive data recorded by a non-affiliated third party, I have a concrete referential 
document to rectify the reliability of my observation even though I could not repeat a similar 
study on the former roundtable. 
 
3.3 DOCUMENT ANALYSIS  
 
I have also decided to include some other written documents as my main focus in the case 
study. Documents such as official statistics “have come to provide a key source of documentary 
                                                   
2 CMU is a service provider to the music industry best known for its media: free daily news 
bulletin the CMU Daily and premium services the CMU Digest and CMU Trends Report. 
(Source: Cooke, 2015, p. 4) 
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information for social scientists” (Denscombe, 2010, p. 217). They satisfy the three important 
elements for social research, 1) Authoritative, they have high credibility; 2) Objective, the 
statistic is impartial without bias to any parties; 3) Factual, “they take the form of numbers that 
are amenable to computer storage/analysis, and constitute ‘hard facts’ over which there can be 
no ambiguity” (Denscombe, 2010, p. 217). 
 
As my goal is to verify the dynamics between the ‘black box’ and its related elements, statistics 
provided by the CMOs could offer me insights different from those I would find through my 
observations. In addition to that, according to some analysts such as Gervais (2010), Smith 
(2011) and Cooke (2015 & 2016), there is a high possibility that money will be ‘trapped’ inside 
CMOs. This argument may sound strange for some because CMOs were entrusted by the artists 
themselves to collect and distribute their royalties. However, this conspiracy theory gave me 
even more reason to start my investigation on the financial reports.  
 
In reality, ‘black box money’ is missing revenue, or in other words, money that has disappeared 
in the revenue stream. To help me identify these sums of money, I would need some special 
guidance because they will be camouflaged under different accounts in the financial reports. 
Hence, I will be focusing on the CMOs in Norway such as TONO and GRAMO as I have 
access to in depth implicit information provided by reliable sources. Furthermore, I will be 
including their financial reports from 2010 to 2015 so I can analyse their variables along the 
years in detail. 
  
3.4 QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Bearing in mind that ‘black box money’ is not an easy subject to be discussed openly (Lindvall, 
2008), I have decided to advance my case study via a web-based questionnaire. Unlike 
conventional paper-and-pen questionnaires, this has the “twin benefits of speed and accuracy 
in terms of data collection” (Denscombe, 2010, p. 174). Respondents will receive an email 
invitation where they will be provided with a link to my questionnaire. With just a click, they 
will be directed to my questionnaire and they could submit their answers with another 
keystroke once they have completed it. The process is simple and easier to understand, and the 
system will collate the answers into a spreadsheet or database for me automatically. Later, I 
could check and compare my respondents’ answers at ease without a hassle.   
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Using a web-based questionnaire also allowed me to introduce sensitive questions to my 
respondents less aggressively. Without being in front of them while collecting their responses, 
I could “help to overcome embarrassment on topics and allow the respondent to open up in a 
way that is unlikely to happen in the physical presence of a researcher” (Denscombe, 2010, p. 
193). Even better, web-based questionnaires will not have time and space constraints, hence 
the participants can respond at their own convenience.  
 
There are a total of eight questions in my questionnaire, and I have avoided using key words 
such as ‘black box’ so I would not affect the participants’ attitudes unintentionally 
(Denscombe, 2010, p. 155). My main intention is to find out their views on the growth of music 
steaming in relation to missing revenue and the low earning margin for the artists/creators. 
Before sending out the invitation to my questionnaire, I sought the approval of my advisors to 
make sure they are suitable and match my research subject. At first, I sent out more than 10 
invitations to specially selected target groups suggested by my advisors. They are professionals 
at senior management level in different entities, ranging from music management agencies, 
CMOs, publishers to labels. Unfortunately, I only managed to get three of them to reply. Prior 
to revealing the identity of my respondents, I have received their permission to publish their 
answers and quote them in my research. Below is a summary of their biographies and a sample 
of my questionnaire. 
 
3.4.1 PARTICIPANTS’ BIOGRAPHY 
 
Niels Mosumgaard  
Niels Mosumgaard is chairman of Danske Populær Autorer (DPA)3. He represents DPA in 
Koda4's board of directors, where he is also the chairman of the board. In addition, he represents 
DPA in the European umbrella organisation for composers, Alliance of Popular Composer 
Organizations in Europe (APCOE)/European Composer and Songwriter Alliance (ECSA), and 
                                                   
3 The Danske Populær Autorer (DPA), also known as the Danish Songwriters Guild in 
English. (Source: https://dpa.org/dpa-english) 
4 Koda is a non-profit collective rights management society that administers Danish and 
international copyrights for music creators and publishers, when their music is performed in 
public. (Source: https://www.koda.dk/about-koda) 
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Nordiske Populærautorer (NPU). Niels is an active songwriter, author, and composer of music 
for documentaries.5  
 
Erica Smith  
 
“Erica K. Smith has been the CEO of COSCAP6 since 2000 and has over these years developed 
a sound reputation locally and regionally in collective management. Academically, she has 
specialised in intellectual property law and international business and has focused on corporate 
governance and business management as well as business strategy development. Erica has 
written several papers on the commercialisation and development of the copyright regime, 
innovation and the creative sector in the Caribbean.” (COSCAP, 2017) 
 
Jim Griffin 
 
“Jim Griffin is Managing Director of OneHouse, dedicated to the future of music and 
entertainment delivery, and works as a consultant to absorb uncertainty about the digital 
delivery of art. In addition to serving as an agent for constructive change in media and 
technology, he is an author, serving as a columnist for magazines, and is on the boards of 
companies and associations. He started and ran for five years the technology department at 
Geffen Records. Prior to Geffen he was an International Representative for The Newspaper 
Guild in Washington, D.C.” (OneHouse, 2014)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
5 The biography of Niels Mosumgaard was written in Danish originally. (Source: 
https://dpa.org/bestyrelsen)  
6 COSCAP is a non-profit copyright membership organisation representing, the performing 
and reproduction rights in music of composers, authors and publishers, and the related rights 
of performers and producers of sound recordings and videograms. (Source: 
http://coscap.org/about) 
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3.4.2 QUESTIONNAIRE SAMPLE 
 
Q1.  The music industry has not clearly defined whether a stream should be considered a sale, 
a broadcast or something else entirely. What is your interpretation on that? 
 
Q2.  We have seen some old business practices in physical distribution being carried over to 
music streaming, and some argue that previous practices such as 'break-even'7 should not be 
applicable to music streaming since streams are not tangible items. Do you agree with this 
argument, and why? 
 
Q3: Are there any other practices that you think should or should not be used in music 
streaming? 
 
Q4. In recent years, record companies have seen a significant decrease in their global turnover, 
whilst most of the Collective Management Organisations (CMOs)/ collecting societies were in 
the contrary. Is this true from your personal experience too? 
 
Q5: Several experts claim that if metadata were to be coordinated, the music industry as a 
whole could save billions of dollars yearly. That being said, none of the attempts at creating a 
Global Repertoire Registry (e.g: GRD, IMR) were successful. If you were given the 
opportunity to take up another campaign to setup a GRR, what would your main objectives be, 
and would you go for a different approach? 
 
Q6: Due to the nature of the copyright law in some territories, a rights holder does not 
necessarily have to be the creator. Many believe that rights holders and other stakeholders are 
trying to manipulate the system in order to reduce payment to the creators. What is your take 
on the existing copyright law and what are the improvements that you would like to see in the 
near future? 
 
Q7: In a situation where there is a sum of unallocated revenues circulating in one’s 
establishment, what is your best suggestion to relocate this money as fair as possible? 
 
                                                   
7 ‘Break-even’ is another term for ‘breakage’. 
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Q8: Monies are withheld in the management of royalties in the recorded music industry. Who 
do you think are not accountable, and mostly to blame? (Participants were given these choices) 
  
o Record labels 
o Publishers 
o Collective management societies (CMOs) 
o Consumers (piracy) 
o Digital Service Providers (DSPs) e.g: Spotify, Apple 
o Platform services e.g: Google, Facebook, Soundcloud etc. 
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4. FINDINGS 
 
The roundtable reports from MMF turned out to be more informative than I had expected, and 
they lined up very nicely with the field notes I had obtained from The Kristiansand Roundtable 
Conference. The collection of personal testimonials that was incorporated in the reports gave 
me a vivid impression, as if I had personally attended the roundtable myself. Even though there 
was plenty of interesting information that could be found inside the reports, I had to collect the 
data more selectively so I would not drift away from my research subject. In relation to solving 
my research questions, the findings that I had uncovered from both the music roundtables had 
helped me make sense of the negative impact of music streaming on the revenue of artists, and 
how the changes in the music industry had ‘misguided’ the missing revenue into the ‘black 
box’. 
 
On the other hand, the financial reports cleared up the debate over whether CMOs are keeping 
their own share of ‘black box money’ or not. The process of identifying the missing revenue 
took me a great deal of time, but it was certainly worth my effort. One interesting note I had 
discovered is that the information provided in the English version of the financial reports was 
not as comprehensive as those in Norwegian. For instance, TONO’s English version financial 
report in 2015 only had 12 pages in total, whereas the Norwegian version had 60 pages; 80 per 
cent of the information was lost in the translation. Considering my interest in the financial 
reports was to dissect the statistical figures provided by the CMO, I decided to use the 
Norwegian reports although I am not a Norwegian speaker. To make sure there was no 
misunderstanding in my analysis, I consulted the Chairman of TONO, Bendik Hofseth, on the 
technical terminology used in the reports. 
 
Finally, the answers that I received via my web-based questionnaire have reaffirmed most of 
the findings I discovered in the first two research methods. Furthermore, my respondents also 
suggested some valuable solutions for reducing the ‘black box money’. In the next chapter, I 
will analyse some feasible solutions to the problems in music streaming, and what different 
entities in the music industry could do to prevent more missing revenue in the future. 
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4.1 MUSIC ROUNDTABLES 
 
When the copyright law and authorities were unable to address the ‘black box’ issue promptly, 
the music roundtable became an alternative platform for individuals to voice their 
dissatisfaction and discuss it directly with the opposite party, as well as other important figures 
in the music industry. Such events were created to stimulate dialogue among different sides in 
the music industry, and to provide an equal platform for all to exchange ideas. Although these 
music roundtables do not always produce solutions, the outcome of the debate is often neutral 
and non-biased.  
 
4.1.1 OLD ORDER, NEW STRUCTURE  
 
The opening theme of both roundtables was rather similar, as if there was a mutual 
understanding that the music industry was in need of a major overhaul. Many of the current 
issues in the industry are unavoidable because the old system that was applied on physical 
goods has been brought into the digital realm. Although the music industry is now mainly 
relying on music streaming to keep their sales afloat, the standard models for music licensing, 
royalties calculation and distribution are still very confusing (Cooke, 2015, p. 5). In music 
streaming, consumers do not own a copy of the music permanently, like a CD or a vinyl. But, 
they have control of which music they would like to listen to, whenever and wherever they 
want. The current system has not matured enough to adapt to this on-demand subscription-
based model because none of the existing models were made to convert transactions from 
music streaming. So while the music industry is busy evolving new licensing standards, many 
of the older ones are still applicable to music streaming services.  
 
The list of old system order over new structure in music streaming continues in other areas, 
which include the copyright law too. In spite of the huge transformation in the music industry, 
the fundamentals of the copyright law have remained fairly the same over the past decades. 
Other than new enactments created in relation to sharing of information goods on the internet 
(e.g. making available right, DMCA and safe harbouring), the blueprint of the copyright law 
remains unchanged. In addition to that, an anonymous representative from an agency pointed 
out the Berne Convention might not be relevant to the modern music industry anymore (The 
Kristiansand Roundtable Conference, 2016). When this centuries-old copyright agreement was 
put to the test, it often shows incompetency in catering copyright protection for music 
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streaming. Take the creation of a centralised data and registry, for example. The Berne 
Convention quickly became a deal-breaker for bringing all the countries on board because it 
prevented formality and dependency amongst countries; according to Article 5(2), “a country 
party to the Berne Convention…can't impose a mandatory registration system for copyright” 
(Gervais, 2010). Although there are researchers who think that was a bad interpretation on the 
Berne Convention and it “could not be served as a barrier to legislation treatment” (The 
Kristiansand Roundtable Conference, 2016), it certainly prompted us to question whether the 
existing copyright framework is fit to govern the music streaming business. 
 
In extension, the Berne Convention has not been very clear on "the specifics of assignment or 
licensing agreements, or how the ownership and control of individual copyrights is divided and 
transferred” (Cooke, 2015, p. 26). Artists may end up losing the rights to their music creations 
through unregulated rights assignment and several changes of ownership, and be relegated to 
the bottom of the revenue chain. The alienation between the rights holder and the creator has 
allowed those with greater rights to exploit the system (Cooke, 2015), and ‘black box money’ 
could be one of the most notable by-products. A scholar in The Kristiansand Roundtable 
Conference concludes that the Berne Convention could be the paradox of copyright (The 
Kristiansand Roundtable Conference, 2016) when it is preventing greater protection to be done 
in the current music industry. 
 
4.1.2 THE USE OF TERMINOLOGY  
 
The leap from analogue to digital music has brought the competition to an international level, 
where there is no geographical limitation. As long as there is an internet connection, artists 
could deliver their music to every corner of the globe. However, there is a major setback in 
synchronizing the music copyright across different nations, because the use and understanding 
of terminology varies significantly between the ‘common law’ and ‘civil law’ (Cooke, 2015, 
p. 6). In certain contexts, ‘neighbouring right’ is understood as the ‘sound recording right’ in 
some of the civil law systems, as opposed to the ‘author right’. But now, it is often used to refer 
to the ‘performing rights’ in sound recording, or even as the performer equitable remuneration. 
The term ‘neighbouring right’ was granted multiple meanings due to the variation in different 
copyright laws and business practices. Similarly, the term ‘streaming’ has a very different 
definition, depending on which country we are talking about. For some countries, streaming is 
exploiting both ‘reproduction right’ and ‘performance right’; or probably the ‘making available 
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right’ (Cooke, 2015). Yet in the US, ‘reproduction right’ is exempted from music streaming 
and only applicable to digital downloads. On top of that, no one is certain whether music 
streaming should be considered as a sale or not, which prompted the music industry to redefine 
the terms that are being used in the DSPs (The Kristiansand Roundtable Conference, 2016). 
 
The use of words here is not child’s play because assigning and distributing rights are the 
essence of the music business. Royalties allocation will become a disaster if the involved 
parties do not perceive the terms or rights in the same way. Cooke has suggested an alternative 
solution for the artists to seek higher payout from music streaming through ‘performer 
equitable remuneration’ (performer ER), but that idea is being hindered by the confusing use 
of terminology. Originating from the Rome Convention of 1961, performer ER is one of two 
main sets of ‘performer rights’ or ‘moral rights’ granted to all performing artists. Featured 
artists and session musicians are entitled to receive remuneration from certain exploitations of 
their sound recordings. These ‘performer rights’ are usually ‘non-waivable’, but “corporate 
rights owners will usually insist that they are, which may make these rights ineffective in real 
terms” (Cooke, 2015, p. 27).  
 
On the other hand, if these rights were to be accepted, corporate rights owners will argue they 
are not being recognized in music streaming because it exploits a separate performing right 
called the ‘making available right’ (Cooke, 2015). Since music streaming does not fit into the 
bricks and mortar distribution method, it creates a loophole for people to interpret according to 
which copyright system they are inclined to. In an ideal scenario, performer ER should be due 
regardless of which rights were being exploited in music streaming. Cooke explains “this 
would mean a significant shift in negotiating power for featured artists unable to secure better 
digital royalties from their labels, while opening up a new revenue stream for session musicians 
who usually have no contractual right to a share of digital income” (Cooke, 2015, p. 60).  
 
Perhaps this is the reason why the discussion about performer ER in music streaming is often 
unheard of. The fear of sharing higher revenue with the artists makes the labels want to 
withdraw themselves from acknowledging this issue. Based on a survey, label representatives 
expressed their concern that the implementation of performer ER might mean a 50/50 split 
between labels and artists, which could destabilise their business (Cooke, 2016, p. 8). They 
argue that the music business remains a high risk business in the digital market. Therefore, they 
could not afford to increase their artists’ royalties. To put it bluntly, why give the artists a 
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higher payout when they have to make money from ‘free’ music. Moreover, copyright law 
does not have a definite description on what performer ER really is (Cooke, 2015; Cooke, 
2016), which makes it an elusive topic to deliberate on. Despite that, 91 per cent of artist 
managers still insist that performer ER should be included in music streaming (Cooke, 2015, 
p. 50). Or, as suggested by one of them, “it would need to be a minimum rate, because artist 
deals vary so much. Artists with distribution deals may be getting a higher rate already than 
what we are proposing they would get from equitable remuneration” (Cooke, 2016, p. 42). 
 
4.1.3 LOST IN COMMUNICATION  
  
Most of the artist managers have no clue about the revenue share arrangement and minimum 
payments of their artists in music streaming services. Their enthusiasm to learn is being put off 
by the apathetic opportunity given by their labels, publishers, DSPs and even CMOs (Cooke, 
2015). Less than a quarter of them have ever been invited by their labels and/or publishers to 
attend briefings about digital income and royalties of their artists. Only 9 per cent of them know 
about the charges and deductions made by their labels before paying their artists, and 13 per 
cent of them are certain that digital income was not clearly stated on their artists’ royalty 
statement (Cooke, 2015, p. 49). On a side note, more than half of them did not know whether 
their labels have ever shared the unspeakable ‘black box money’ with their artists or not 
(Cooke, 2015, p. 49). 
 
As I have mentioned, this disconnect of information is due to the ‘NDA culture’ (Cooke, 2015, 
p. 64) in music streaming services. Artists and managers are being kept away from their basic 
rights to understand their revenue stream, and this is not a myth but a fact. Rights owners and 
DSPs are pointing fingers at each other when it comes to being guilty of promoting the use of 
NDAs, and they claimd they are just following the competition law (Cooke, 2016, p. 10). Thus, 
they need to maintain market competition by regulating anti-competitive conduct (Taylor M. 
D., 2006), such as classifying the figures as non-disclosure. With little insight on the deals 
arrangement and being handicapped under the copyright law, working for labels is simply 
cooperation slavery in disguise.  
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4.1.4 GREATER POWER FOR THE LABELS  
 
There is a growing consensus that the streaming business is tilting over to the advantage of the 
labels, where deal negotiations always start with them, followed by the publishers and CMOs. 
Since DSPs “having already committed up to 60% of its revenues to those who control the 
recording rights” (Cooke, 2016, p. 32), publishers have to live up with a smaller split and never 
get to negotiate with the labels directly. The power of negotiation is very critical in the music 
industry – in fact, in any other industry – because whoever gets the lion’s share will get to 
determine the other’s fate in the revenue chain. Take the performer ER for example, the actual 
implementation of it in music streaming will very likely remain as an idea if the labels do not 
come on board. Since the labels have more power in the music industry, their opinion is enough 
to influence the entire industry, which sometimes included the lawmakers. History has shown 
us that governments have the tendency to protect influential establishments in the entertainment 
industry by amending the copyright to protect their interests. Long ago in the United States, 
President Clinton passed a special copyright extension called the Sonny Bono Act to save Walt 
Disney’s most important cartoon figure, Mickey Mouse, from falling into the public domain 
(Lee T. B., 2013). This unconventional extension stretched the initial 56 years of copyright 
ownership to 75 years, an additional of 19 years, just to keep Mickey safe before Disney’s 
copyright expired. So, granted that some European countries are getting their hands onto the 
performer ER issue, the result is less optimistic and yet to be determined (Cooke, 2015, p. 60).  
 
Furthermore, the labels also have a direct impact on the distribution networking in the DSPs. 
As the main music providers, major labels get to persuade the DSPs which artists they would 
like to showcase. Consequently, only those who are handpicked by the labels will excel in the 
music industry, which resonates with the “Superstar Effect” that I have mentioned earlier. The 
major labels are dominating the music industry now because they could flex their muscle both 
in the supplying and receiving ends. Hence many new music managers think it is difficult to 
build their artist’s career because the major labels have become the gatekeepers once again 
(The Kristiansand Roundtable Conference, 2016).  
 
4.1.5 GOOD CMOs & BAD CMOs  
  
While the limelight is on the labels, some artists are hoping their trusty CMOs could step in 
and provide some much-needed assistance. Back in the days of physical distribution, labels 
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and publishers would have the CMOs to collect the royalties within a collective licensing 
system. Considering the music albums were ‘rights ready’, labels and publishers did not need 
to negotiate terms and conditions with the music stores. Instead, the task of collecting royalties 
falls under the CMOs and its being done collectively for both labels and publishers. However, 
collective licensing is less common in music streaming since the labels and publishers negotiate 
directly with the DSPs. Hence, the system gave way to NDAs and the rest is history.  
 
To achieve fairer pay in music streaming, many artists hope to see more digital deals done in 
the fashion of collective licensing (Cooke, 2016, pp. 72-74). They believe the system would 
give them a standardized per stream payout because it prevents any disproportionate 
agreements made in the NDA. However, collective licensing is not entirely reliable and it 
posses other problems. It depends heavily on the efficiency of the CMOs, and some of them 
could be “slow decision makers, lack transparency and charge high commissions and fees” 
(Cooke, 2016, p. 12). In addition to establishing an international collective licensing, local 
CMOs have to form reciprocal agreements with their overseas counterparts, which they do not 
have direct control over. The quality of license negotiation, record of usage data, royalty 
collection, and distribution are not always guaranteed, plus the process will take longer along 
with more commission fees (Cooke, 2016). In such an event, artists may end up losing more 
royalties rather than gaining. 
 
There are a handful of good CMOs out there, but there are some bad ones too; and they could 
possibly be corrupted (Cooke, 2016, pp. 74-76). I have learnt that there is no instant solution 
for the issues in music streaming, and ‘black box money’ is just the destination of the problems. 
Being able to identify how revenues end up in the ‘black box’ and preventing it from happening 
is more crucial than sourcing the ‘black box money’. Generally, labels do not respond well 
when they are questioned about the ‘black box money’ (which they prefer to call ‘breakage’). 
They have not addressed this issue openly until it fell under media scrutiny in 2015. Only then 
did the major labels promise to share the ‘breakage’ with the artists (Cooke, 2015, p. 63). Their 
passive attitude towards the ‘black box’ and many other topics regarding NDA and revenue 
stream makes it difficult for the artists to establish a discussion with them. To quote from an 
anonymous artist manager: “because of the total lack of transparency, you often don’t know 
the question you need to ask – and that’s the big problem. If you don’t know what’s going on, 
you can’t properly assess how the label arrived at x, y or z” (Cooke, 2016, p. 62).  
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4.1.6 TRANSPARENCY VS TRUTH  
 
One key word was heard repeatedly in both roundtables and that is ‘transparency’. The word 
is directed towards the operating system in the digital music business and the information that 
was given to the artists. As I have discussed earlier, the labels are struggling to reveal more 
information to their artists because they must withhold their negotiation power in light with the 
competition law. That being said, even if the labels had agreed to reveal more information, no 
one would have the confidence to guarantee their information is genuine. A lawyer who had 
participated in The Kristiansand Roundtable Conference pointed out the labels might let go of 
transparency but not necessarily the truth (The Kristiansand Roundtable Conference, 2016). 
Being an open book will not benefit them and it may even cause some serious damage to them, 
as well as some of their artists. Although many artists credit themselves as singer/songwriter 
on their resume, in reality, their contribution to a song might not be more than one percent. 
Many labels are aware that not all of their artists would have the talent and capacity to compose 
a song solely by themselves, so they will assign one or more composers to help them. And by 
the time a song is completed, the creators on that song will come up to four or five persons. 
Nevertheless, when the labels are promoting these artists, they will certainly hide this 
information from the public to make the artist look more appealing.  
 
Another reason the labels are not telling the truth is because they may not have the true answer 
as well. Bookkeeping and archiving music are known to be tricky and complex. Thus, some of 
the information will go missing along the way, through generations, if they were not recorded 
diligently. Even if the labels had migrated their data to high performance computerized 
systems, they still would not be able to assure the information that they acquired from the past 
is accurate. When they are in doubt, it is better off for them to keep it a secret to make sure 
their revenue stream will not be compromised. To draw a classic example, Harry Fox Agency 
from the United States has a record of demanding rights clearance although they were not sure 
whether they possessed the rights. Based on a personal testimony, one of the upset requesters 
said, “Five months after first receiving our request for a license to buy these CDs (on a hard 
disc) from Loudeye, the Harry Fox Agency concluded that no license was necessary. Four 
hours later, Harry Fox's New Media Coordinator called me back to say they had changed their 
mind and decided Loudeye did need a license from them.” (Schwartz J. , 2003) Similarly, based 
on an transcript created by Nordgård (2016a), there was a DSP that had requested a list of 
music to be verified by the Harry Fox Agency. The DSP was hoping Harry Fox could point out 
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which songs needed to be cleared by them. But instead of having clear assurance on the list of 
songs that they had to pay for, they were given multiple song titles that Harry Fox themselves 
were unsure of, and were advised to make payment upfront to avoid any legal issues in the 
future. At the end, the DSP decided to verify the music by themselves and were said to have 
collated a list data that was more accurate than the one Harry Fox had in their system.  
 
4.1.7 CONCLUSION 
    
All in all, it was an eye opener for me to learn about the findings from both of the roundtables. 
They have deepened my understanding of ‘black box money’, and helped me to realize that the 
missing revenue is just a piece of the jigsaw in a bigger puzzle. Neither CMOs nor the labels 
would have the opportunity to manipulate the ‘black box money’, if the copyright law could 
oversee music streaming more thoroughly. And from a more radical point of view, I am 
convinced that “copyright is not entirely a right [but] it is capitalism” (The Kristiansand 
Roundtable Conference, 2016). Copyright is made to protect the creators and provide them 
with incentives, but in turn it “gives enterprises excessive market power” (Frith & Marshall, 
2004, p. 60). Through acquisition rights from the artists and/or creators, corporate rights 
holders have become some of the biggest rights holders in the music industry, and get to dictate 
how to capitalise on them. In a similar fashion, big corporate rights holders such as record 
labels were leaching on these copyright loopholes in music streaming and found their way to 
reduce the artists’ earning margin. As music streaming becomes more popular, the problem of 
low margin is being magnified too. Eventually, all these evaporated revenues will end up in 
the ‘black box’ and “it's perfectly legal” (Rosoff, 2011). 
 
4.2 CMOs’ FINANCIAL REPORTS 
 
Transactions made in the music streaming services are less straightforward or transparent as I 
have mentioned earlier, and the labels seem to have problems sharing that bit of information 
with their artists. They are worried that giving out such information could lessen their power 
of negotiation, so they would rather it remain a company secret, by rule of the competition law. 
On the other hand, most CMOs will publish their financial reports annually and make them 
available to their members. Very often, these CMOs are non-profit organisations and they are 
obliged to have full disclosure of their financial records as well as their overall performance. 
TONO (2017) and GRAMO (2017), for example, are cooperative organisations which are 
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operated and co-owned by their members. It is their duty to keep their members informed of 
their operations and to be transparent in the manoeuvring of money. However, these artists-
owned autonomous organisations could not escape the guilt of having their share of the ‘black 
box money’. According to an anonymous CMO representative, it is very hard to find out which 
part of their revenue is ‘unallocatable’ unless you understand where the money came from and 
how it was being distributed. So, even though the financial report is made black and white to 
the public and audited by the authorities, an average person could not have noticed there is 
‘black box money’ within the CMOs. 
 
Similarly, when I first got my hands on the financial reports of TONO and GRAMO, I was just 
as clueless. The ledger in the reports showed nothing more than ordinary accounting and the 
figures were clear and tallied. But soon after I was given some specific pointers, I slowly 
realized how easy it is to manipulate the ‘black box money’ without leaving a trace. Before I 
dive into the analysis of these financial reports, I have to highlight that ‘black box money’ is 
just an umbrella term for ‘unallocated revenues’. It does not necessarily have a negative 
connotation, as not all ‘black box money’ is created on purpose. Other than ‘breakages’ and 
‘unallocated advances’, a huge percentage of ‘unallocated revenues’ are associated with 
incomplete or conflicted data. These revenues are commonly found inside the CMOs, when 
they could not identify the rights holders and subsequently this amount of money will be 
absorbed and repurposed to benefit other artists (Møller, 2016; Smith, 2011). Of course, the 
CMOs could choose to investigate further and clarify who are the rights holders, but then the 
expenses of administrating this process would have dwarfed the revenues that they are going 
to distribute. For this reason, CMOs generally would not dig deep into that matter because their 
performance is based on how well they could collect and distribute the revenues with the least 
amount of administration fees. 
 
In addition, keeping ‘black box money’ within the CMOs themselves will not benefit them. 
Unlike the labels, CMOs that operate as non-profit organizations are not supposed to have 
excessive amounts of cash stuck in their establishment. It is illegal for them to profit from 
‘unallocated revenues’ and they will be deemed incompetent. The pernicious effect of keeping 
extra money that they are not entitled to will eventually lead them to a lawsuit because it is 
against their principal as CMOs. Thus, they have to “ensure that creators receive payment for 
the use of their works” (WIPO, 2017). In spite of that, whenever they are unable to identify the 
rights holders of a particular song, they have to find an alternative and rational way to distribute 
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the ‘unallocatable’ revenue accordingly. Although the method of allocating the ‘black box 
money’ might vary in different CMOs, their goal is the same – to distribute the revenue.  
 
Now, back to the analysis. The performing rights collecting society of Norway, TONO, has a 
good reputation of being an efficient CMO. Over the years, they have maintained a steady 
growth and their progress on high revenues and low expenses is simply remarkable.  
 
 
Figure 2: TONO – Gross income x administration cost from 2010 to 2016 
 
According to their website, they collected NOK588 516 050 (approximately $68,793,892.07 
USD) music royalties in 2015, while their administration costs remained as low as 14.33 per 
cent of the total of their gross income (TONO, 2017). In comparison to the previous year, they 
lowered 1.97 per cent of their administration costs while their gross income rose to 1.19 per 
cent (TONO, 2017). When they have a cost effective solution to collect and distribute the 
revenues, their artists will get more money in return. But to my surprise, the reality might tell 
a very different story. 
 
During my brief conversation with Bendik Hofseth, he told me that TONO does not always 
have the data of the music when they are collecting the revenues. From what I have learnt, a 
lot of music from online distributions and live concerts are being reported without stating 
clearly which song they had used or the data they provided was inaccurate. Misspelling (e.g, 
artist name Billy Bragg written as Bily Brag), incomplete song title (e.g: Work by Rihanna but 
the part ‘ft. Drake’ is missing; or, Womanizer by Britney Spears without clarifying whether it 
was the original version, remastered, acoustic, or Benny Benassi extended), and conflict of data 
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with the registry, are some of the common mistakes they have encountered. So whenever 
TONO tries to process the data, they will have trouble matching the music with their respective 
rights holders. Or in some other cases, TONO was simply unable to trace the rights holders of 
the music. Music used as background music (used in hotel, restaurant, gym, etc.) and for 
random usage (in dance and sports events) are mainly programme-less, so they are covered by 
a form of blanket license. Given this situation, TONO will never get to sort out which music 
they had used in their premises unless the users kept a record and reported back to TONO 
diligently. As a result, not all revenues will be channelled back to the rights holders as they 
would have anticipated because part of their revenues were unfortunately ‘unallocatable’. 
 
  
Figure 3: TONO – Separate revenues from 2010 to 2015 
 
 
Figure 4: TONO – Revenues in percentage from 2010 to 2015 
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On a rough estimation made by comparing TONO’s financial reports from year 2010 to 2015, 
over a quarter of their yearly total revenue could possibly be the ‘unallocatable’ revenues. This 
handsome amount of money is believed to be anything between 100 million to 150 million 
Norwegian crowns (approximately USD $12 million to $18 million) and it may get higher in 
the future. With the exception of random usage, other sources of revenue like live concerts and 
background music are growing gradually every year according to the chart in Figure 3. And 
most noticeably, online distribution has skyrocketed, with an approximately one thousand per 
cent increment from year 2010 to 2015. Although not all of the revenue from online distribution 
were ‘unallocatable’, its relationship with the the growth of ‘black box money’ should be 
parallel. As explained by numerous analysts and researchers such as Cooke (2015; 2016), 
Gervais (2010), Nuaman (2016), Wikstrom (2013) and DeFillipi (2016), online distribution 
relies heavily on music data and the current database is flawed, which means it is certain to 
have ‘unallocated revenues’ within the revenue stream. 
 
To deal with this constant flow of ‘unallocatable’ revenues, TONO has fashioned their own 
standard procedure to reallocate these monies. For instance, revenue generated via background 
music will typically be distributed to other artists based on the trending playlists from the radio 
stationsor music streaming services. Even though this method is undoubtedly biased towards 
superstars and highlights the winner-takes-all effect, it is by far the most practical solution. As 
I have discussed before, TONO has no way to retrieve the information of the music that has 
been played as background music, unless the users report back to them voluntarily. Therefore, 
it is logical to distribute the revenues to other artists according to the trending playlists. 
Seemingly, most premises would be playing popular hits unless they have a very specific 
preference on music. For other ‘unallocatable’ revenues, TONO will keep them under 
probation and wait for the corresponding rights holders to appeal and reclaim their ownership. 
If the revenues are unclaimed within a set period of time, the board of senior management from 
TONO will get to decide how to repurpose them. Very often, they will be turned into 
scholarship or used to support other projects and music festivals like by:Larm to benefit other 
artists. Through diverting these ‘unallocated revenues’ back to artists, TONO has neutralized 
the risk of keeping the ‘black box money’ while making sure they are fulfilling their duty as a 
CMO. 
 
Likewise, the retransmission and mechanical rights collecting society of Norway, GRAMO, 
has a similar ideology towards the treatment of ‘unallocatable’ revenues. Their repertoire and 
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ISRC specialist Morten Møller (2016), gave a couple of examples to me during a workshop I 
attended, and they were almost identical to those that I have learnt from TONO. In a similar 
manner, revenues that were made from background music licenses will be distributed 
according to the radio playlists because they did not receive any status reports from the users. 
As for other ‘unallocatable’ revenues, GRAMO will reallocate them if they are unable to rectify 
with the rights holders within three years. However, it is harder to isolate which portion of their 
revenues in the financial reports could be ‘black box money’. On a quick glance, GRAMO’s 
financial reports have a simpler revenue demographic compared to the ones from TONO. They 
have a more general revenue projection, with television and radio broadcasters as their main 
source of income, followed by miscellaneous background music users and 35 web-casters. Yet 
in contrast to their simple report, they have dedicated a separate account for a cultural fund, 
which prompted me to do a further investigation. Moreover, I was given a hint that the cultural 
fund has a close-knit relationship with the ‘black box money’ and to what has been known as 
‘American money’. 
  
Before the 21st century, Norwegian radio leaned towards playing American music (Møller, 
2016), since America produced some of the best international hits in the 20th century. But, there 
was a hidden agenda behind this preference. Due to the lack of reciprocal agreement between 
Norway and the United States, the Norwegian radios were bidding on not having to pay for the 
usage of American music in their programmes. Hypothetically speaking, the Norwegian radios 
were right about that because GRAMO would not have the rights to license American music 
to the radios without a reciprocal agreement. Since GRAMO did not have a proper path of 
issuing and collecting the rights on behalf of the American CMOs, the radio stations found a 
loophole to exploit the unprotected music. Realizing the absent of reciprocal agreements will 
harm the economic interests for both local and international repertoires, the Norwegian 
parliament created the Fund for Performing Artists or Fond for Utøvende Kunstere (FFUK) in 
the summer of 2000 to put a stop to this ill practice (Fond for Utøvende Kunstere, 2017). 
  
Since then, the Norwegian rights collecting system has evolved into a dual collecting system. 
First, the usual rights collecting system that we are familiar with; second, the new cultural-
political scheme or kulturpolitisk ordning (Fond for Utøvende Kunstere, 2017). The latter will 
allow the CMO, namely GRAMO, to collect levy from the usage of unprotected music like the 
American music and use it to subsidize the FFUK. Under the new dual collecting system, the 
users have to pay GRAMO no matter which music they are going to play in their services or 
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premises (Møller, 2016). Granted that the creation of the FFUK has rehabilitated the balance 
of fair competition between the local and international repertoires, but its function is somewhat 
less convincing than its intention. The source of the funding mainly came from the American 
music, but the FFUK is only accessible for those who are living and working in Norway (Fond 
for Utøvende Kunstere, 2017). And behind the façade of the FFUK, there is a glorified ‘black 
box’ that was created at the expense of American music to benefit the artists in Norway. 
 
 
Figure 5: GRAMO – Revenue stream of the Cultural-Political Scheme  
from 2010 to 2015 
 
Year after year, GRAMO has collected more than 20 million US dollars of ‘American money’ 
on behalf of the FFUK. Despite this enormous amount of money stemming from American 
music, the Norwegian parliament did not see them as royalties of the American artists. Legally 
speaking, they are compensations made to protect the local repertoires and collected through 
the cultural-political scheme. Thus royalties and the American music levy are two very 
different things from two different collecting systems. Without the American music, there is 
no cultural-political scheme and the FFUK would not have existed. Even if FFUK did not take 
the royalties from the American artists, they are still benefiting from the existence of American 
music. From an ethical point of view, it is rather bizarre to think it is alright to make money 
from others without giving them credit. Nonetheless, the final judgement is still in the hands 
of the Norwegian parliament because American music is literally unprotected in their territory. 
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So perhaps ‘American money’ will never be classified as ‘black box money’, because the CMO 
is not making profits out of it and they are used with good intention in the name of cultural and 
political interests. 
 
In all fairness, I would describe the CMOs as intermediaries, facilitators, or “essentially data 
collecting and processing entities” (Gervais, 2010, p. 8). Their main purpose is to assist their 
artists to manage their rights and what comes after would be beyond their responsibility. If the 
data they were given are incorrect or incomplete, they are not obliged to revise them because 
their duty ends once the money is being distributed according to the existing information they 
have (Møller, 2016). Therefore, the best they can do whenever they are dealing with 
‘unallocatable’ revenues is to reallocate them in the best alternative way. As for the ‘American 
money’, it is a one-of-a-kind policy legislated by the parliament, and the CMO, GRAMO, was 
just a mere intermediary. To conclude my analysis, it is confirmed that ‘black box money’ does 
circulate in CMOs regardless of their performance. They might be liable for not enforcing a 
more assertive music data submission from the users, but the core problem of missing revenue 
still goes back to the absence of an accurate international database and an outdated copyright 
law in music streaming. 
   
4.3 THE RESPONSES  
 
Across two continents, and three nations, these three very different individuals represent 
different aspects in the music industry. Some of them offered their opinions on legislation 
matters and some others offered suggestions that have more business undertones. In spite of 
that, they, too, could not agree on what streaming should be considered as in the ever growing 
digital market. Smith was determined that it should be taken as broadcast while Mosumgaard 
thinks it is too early to judge. Personally, I am more inclined to the latter idea because music 
streaming is still developing and copyright law was not designed for ‘one-size-fit-all’. More 
work needs to be done before we can conclude which business model music streaming really 
belongs to, though in the meantime, we have to find feasible solutions to the problems in the 
music streaming services. Nonetheless, just as Griffin mentioned, music streaming certainly 
does not fit into the mould of selling tangible items, so the new business model has to be 
differentiated from physical distribution. 
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Next, in the topic of whether ‘breakage’ should be applicable to music streaming or not, Smith 
and Griffin were on the same page – they think the involved parties have to acknowledge the 
startling differences between the old industry and the modern one. There must be a moderation 
between keeping up with the tradition and holding on to out-dated practices. On the other hand, 
Mosumgaard thinks ‘breakage’ is there to stay because it is part of the investments. Aligned to 
the reason provided by the labels, he argued they are pumping in money to support their artists 
from making music, to distributing it to the public. So regardless of whether it is online or 
offline, labels should be entitled to apply ‘breakages’ since it remains as a high risk investment 
to groom an artist (Cooke, 2016). The argument of using risk taking as a free pass to collect 
additional money has become less convincing in the digital market since the margin has 
become drastically low nowadays. On a typical arrangement, labels can charge up to 20 per 
cent of ‘breakage’ to their artists, which is considerably very high when most of the artists only 
earn around USD $0.004891 per stream (Resnikoff, 2016). If they still insist this is a reasonable 
precaution, at least the labels could lower it down to a more rational percentage, or start 
explaining how they come up to 20 per cent. 
 
We have learnt that the music industry has been through a rough time in the past decades since 
the emergence of P2P sharing and online piracy. The rise of the disruptive technology has 
forced the industry to seek a different approach on distributing their music and only recently, 
they found a promising solution in music streaming. However, based on the reports issued by 
IFPI (2016) and CISAC (2016), the growth in the global turnover is not parallel across different 
regions. In North America for example, CISAC reported they have the “strongest growth with 
a 33 per cent increase in collections year on year” (CISAC, 2016, p. 12) while IFPI showed 
only a 1.4 per cent increment (IFPI, 2016, p. 11). Of course, there are some other regions such 
as Latin America, where IFPI shows higher growth than CISAC, but in the overall global 
turnover, CMOs seem to perform better than the labels. Out of curiosity, I decided to verify 
this with my respondents and most of them have attested to that phenomenon. This may signify 
that collective licensing could be a more efficient way to collect royalties in music streaming, 
so many artists are hoping this will become the primary method in the future (Cooke, 2016). 
 
I also shared my concern on the creation of a (full meaning of ‘GRR’) GRR and wanted to find 
out what other solutions they had in mind. Over the years, many CMOs have attempted to 
create a GRR but none of them have managed to succeed. First, there was the International 
Music Joint Venture (IMJV), which pledged to create a “system for processing music rights in 
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a world where everything is watermarked and trackable” (Clark-Meads, 1999). Spearheaded 
by the former CEO of Burma/Stemra, Cees Vervood, they, together with ASCAP and PRS, 
have invested USD $20 million into this pioneering project and projected that they could save 
up to 15 percent of their administration cost in return (Clark-Meads, 1999). As promising as it 
might sound, the IMJV ended in failure (Milosic, 2015) and no further explanation was given 
by them. Similarly, the International Music Registry (IMR) and Global Repertoire Database 
(GRD) that were initiated in the following years ended in failure too, even though they were 
backed by WIPO and CISAC respectively (Milosic, 2015).  
 
The GRD project alone was reported to have left behind a debt of more than USD $13.7 million 
by July 2014, and some of the CMOs have begun to pull themselves out of the project (Milosic, 
2015). Other sources suggested that the CMOs feared “losing revenue from operational costs 
under a more efficient GRD system” (Milosic, 2015). With lower revenue, CMOs might need 
to face the horror of downsizing their organisation and laying off their employees. According 
to Møller (2016), he too recognized that having a GRR would eventually lead them to replace 
their human workforce with more computers and servers. Also, there was a potential dispute 
amongst CMOs over the control of the global database (Milosic, 2015). Although creating a 
GRR is a joint effort voluntary project, it is hard to decide when it comes to who should have 
control over the database. Should it be overseen by a neutral third party or should a new cross-
border union be set up to monitor the database?  
 
That said, Mosumgaard and Griffin both recommend developing a decentralized system. A 
centralized system normally stores all its information in one place or prioritizes all the 
resources onto a main asset, so if something went wrong with the primary component, the entire 
system will fail. A decentralized system, on the other hand, works through a network of 
individual units – they share and verify information with each other so it has a higher fault 
tolerance. The idea of a decentralized system was first introduced by Paul Baran in 1964 to 
improve the telecommunication network during the Cold War. He realised it was hard to 
guarantee the survivability of any single telecommunication station during the war, thus 
decentralizing the main station would allow the communication system to anticipate the 
“worst-case destruction of both enemy attack and normal system failures” (Baran, 1964, p. 16)   
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Figure 6: Centralized and decentralized networks by Paul Baran8 
 
This method is applicable to organizing music data as well. Instead of creating a single access 
platform which is run by a dedicated back office, a GRR could be developed through 
connecting various regional offices to form an international metadata exchange hub. First, 
regional offices such as CMOs will collate repertoires into their own databases locally. Then, 
they could exchange and verify the data that they have obtained with their overseas 
counterparts. Through this process, they can filter out any repeated or incomplete repertoires 
because they could compare their data against one another. The broader the network is, the 
more accurate their metadata will be, since there are more samples they could verify with. And 
above all, CMOs in this system can act autonomously without worrying who is going to dictate 
the network. The FastTrack system that was suggested by Mosumgaard earlier was based on a 
similar framework, and even better, it has incorporated the International Standard musical 
Works Code (ISWC) identifier (FastTrack, 2016) into its system. To date, they are providing 
“122 CMOs with access to metadata on more than 36.1 million single musical works and 3.7 
million audio-visual works, and information on agreements and sub-publishing agreements” 
(FastTrack, 2016).  
 
Alternatively, the other suggestion for a decentralized system is to harness the Domain Name 
System (DNS) technology that have governed the internet since the beginning of the World 
Wide Web (WWW). Endorsed by Griffin himself, the DNS can identify metadata easily by 
deciphering information from the internet with their domain names and Internet Protocol 
addresses (IP addresses). Because every single IP address associated with the information is 
unique, like a fingerprint, it keeps the possibility of retrieving the wrong piece of information 
to a minimal. In line with that, a tech company called MusicBrain has developed their own 
                                                   
8 This illustration is captured from Baran, 1964, p.2 
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music identifier, MusicBrainz Identifier (MBID), based on a similar theory. They have 
assigned a unique MBID to each of their entities in their database which includes artists, release 
groups, releases, recordings, works, labels, areas, places and URLs (CallerNo6, 2016), instead 
of recalling them semantically. They are confident that their MBIDs can be used for 
disambiguation since entities that share the same name could be distinguished immediately 
with their different MBIDs. For example, soundtrack composer John Williams has a MBID of 
‘53b106e7-0cc6-42cc-ac95-ed8d30a3a98e’ and classical guitar player John Williams has 
‘8b8a38a9-a290-4560-84f6-3d4466e8d791’ (CallerNo6, 2016). There is no resemblance 
between these two MBIDs even though the artists’ names are the same. In other words, this 
system could eliminate human error in music data registry such as misspelling and increase the 
accuracy of the data. 
 
While there are some promising suggestions offered by Mosumgaard and Griffin, Smith thinks 
creating a GRR would be a mission impossible from a political standpoint. Countries where 
copyright is the main export will be at a disadvantage if they were to share their valuable data 
with other nations freely. In the USA, for example, the copyright industry has been the driving 
force behind their economic growth. The industry as a whole has offered more than one billion 
employment opportunities and contributed up to 11.69 percent of their overall economy 
(Siwek, 2016). Opening up their database might bring unforeseen circumstances to their 
copyright industry, and put their $2.1 trillion USD industry at risk.  
 
Moving on, I want to address the elephant in the room, the belief that rights holders and other 
stakeholders have manipulated the system to their advantage (Cooke, 2015, p. 22). To recap 
what I have highlighted before, the copyright law is very flexible and it does not govern how 
copyright is being assigned, transferred or divided among different rights holders. And in some 
less favourable arrangements, creators end up losing control over their creations and are 
sabotaged in both revenue stream and artistic expression. Among my respondents, Smith 
described them as ‘nefarious practices’ and Griffin just cut to the chase, pointing out that was 
a ‘black box’ in the system. Again, the alleged wrongdoings of the corporate rights holders and 
stakeholders are further confirmed by the professionals. It shows that these are not 
assumptions, but have actually happened, and are possibly worsened in DSPs like YouTube 
and Soundcloud, behind the more controversial safe harbour legislation. 
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Year over year, YouTube has been growing based on their user-generated content (UGC) and 
within these content many of them were unlicensed copies, remakes, or covers from other 
artists created by the users themselves. In that sense, YouTube should be held accountable for 
copyright infringement since they have failed to monitor the unlicensed content on their 
platform. Yet, they have managed to get away with it through the safe harbour law (Cooke, 
2015, p. 12). The law protected YouTube from liability, “as long as they respond to takedown 
notices from rights holders” (Levine, 2016). Nonetheless, this takedown process has become 
redundant since there is too much content to be monitored across the platform and similar 
content will be uploaded soon after one has been taken down. American artist manager Irving 
Azoff bewails that YouTube is “a serious threat to artists” and “a system that is rigged against 
the artists” (Kosoff, 2016). Artists and rights holders are losing revenue to safe harbouring, and 
DSPs have found a new way to churn in their share of the ‘black box money’. 
 
Since it is unavoidable to have ‘unallocated revenues’ circulating in labels, CMOs and now 
even in the DSPs, the solution hinges on creating a decentralized GRR, amending the copyright 
law and improving transparency in the industry. At the same time, the current method of 
redistributing ‘unallocated revenues’ among the CMOs has received the green light from my 
respondents. Recycling the monies back to the distribution pool seems to be a reasonable 
solution and contributing part of them to cultural and developmental activities even had the 
seal of approval from Smith. Even though these ideas do not help relocate the ‘unallocatable’ 
revenue back to the rights holders, the revenue is not being taken advantage of, to say the least. 
 
Finally, in my short survey of who should be held accountable for creating the ‘black box 
money’ in the music industry, the vote was unanimous that record labels are the one to blame, 
followed by a separate vote for publishers, CMOs, DSPs and other platform services (e.g: 
Google and Facebook) respectively. Sure enough, record labels are possibly the guiltiest of 
creating the ‘black box money’ because they have been caught red handed on several occasions. 
From the substantial amount of advances received by Sony (Cooke, 2015; Singleton, 2015) to 
Lady Gaga’s missing revenue from DSPs (Resnikoff, 2014 & 2015), the evidence consistently 
shows record labels making ‘black box money’ on purpose. Notwithstanding, it would take 
two hands to clap in the process of generating ‘black box money’. There must be loopholes in 
music streaming in order to satisfy the production of ‘unallocated revenues’, ‘unallocated 
advances’ and ‘breakages’, otherwise artists would not be protesting they were not getting paid 
enough from DSPs.  
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5. ANALYSIS 
  
Looking at to the information that I have unearthed, I can confidently say music streaming has 
reduced artists’ revenue tremendously. We have seen how the copyright law has not been able 
to cope with the rapid development and changes in the digital age, and the lack of governance 
towards newer technologies has reduced the transparency in the operating system drastically. 
As a result, the complexity in the digital market has spiked up and artists have become the 
ultimate victims. The average per stream payout in Spotify for an artist has dropped to USD 
$0.004891 (Resnikoff, 2016), and sometimes it would go as low as USD $0.0003 (Information 
is Beautiful, 2015) for some other DSPs like YouTube. These figures are alarming because 
they put in doubt the sustainability of the revenue stream for most performing artists through 
music streaming. Knowingly, this phenomenon was predicted by David Bowie (Frith, 2007; 
Krueger, 2005) where the value of music was reduced significantly after digitalization, but 
artists should not be earning les from the digital market, when music streaming is bringing in 
a handsome amount every year.  
 
According to the latest IFPI report, the music industry has reached another new milestone in 
2016, where they have achieved the highest growth rate since 1997. (IFPI, 2017, p. 10) The 
global recorded music market has grown 5.9 percent and the digital income accounted for half 
of the global revenue growth. Within these promising improvements, “streaming has been the 
clear driver of this growth, with revenues surging by 60.4 per cent” (IFPI, 2017, p. 10). This is 
not the first time that music streaming has been crowned as the main contributor to the music 
industry (Shaw, 2016), and its performance has been consistent in the past couple of years. 
Having said that, artists have not been able to enjoy the positive impact brought by the growth 
in the industry, and to make it worse, their earning margin has decreased over the years.  
 
Evidently, artists are getting a smaller share from a bigger pie due to the play of ‘black box 
money’ in the system. Inside the ‘black box’, there are ‘unallocated advances’ and ‘breakages’ 
which have a close relationship with the NDAs signed between DSPs and record labels. But 
on the whole, ‘unallocated revenues’ are the most prominent source of the ‘black box money’. 
Since CMOs have not succeeded in creating a GRR, locating the correct rights holders would 
have to rely on the music data they have acquired from the rights holders and users. If the data 
given to them was incorrect or incomplete, the corresponding royalty will be deemed as 
‘unallocatable’, beyond the reach of the artist. These ‘unallocated revenues’ will eventually be 
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repurposed by CMOs as cultural funding or reallocated to other artists’ revenue stream. CMOs 
have put in ample effort to amend this problem, but none of them have managed to pull it off 
thus far (Milosic, 2015). The main obstacle in creating a GRR still rests between money and 
information, where CMOs have underestimated the budget involved in the project, and the 
amount of data they would need to contribute to the system. (Milosic, 2015) Coincidentally, 
the data that they have to reveal touches the transparency part of the subject again, thus making 
the ‘black box money’ an even harder issue to tackle. 
 
The problems and struggles of making music streaming a more sustainable outlet should not 
be the concern of recording artists only. If the core members, namely the creators, in the 
industry are having a hard time surviving through music streaming, it will eventually affect the 
entire system. Of course, some might argue the music industry will never run out of supplies, 
since they are 20,000 new tracks emerging every day (Wikström & DeFillippi, 2016, p. 196). 
But would it not be modern day slavery in disguise if we are going to ignore it completely? 
The ‘black box’ issue is something happening in the music industry that we desperately need 
to have a conversation about. Every individual in the industry should be ready to make changes 
for the better, instead of worrying that their share of revenue would be affected.  
 
5.1 THE COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
According what I have learnt from The Kristiansand Roundtable Conference and MMF, the 
current copyright law is struggling to keep up with the advancement of technology. It would 
take more than a decade for lawmakers like the EU directive to make a new amendment in the 
copyright law (Jenner, 2016), because there are different stages of consultation and 
confirmation before a suggestion could be delivered to the directive. If we do the maths 
correctly, copyright law will always fall behind the technology unless the policy making 
process gets an upgrade with a shorter procedure. Or there should be an emergency act that 
could take place when needed. Otherwise, the music industry will be overrun by the de facto 
standard and problems such as the ‘black box’ issue will be prolonged indefinitely. 
 
5.1.1 SAFE HARBOURING & ‘VALUE GAP’ 
 
Two decades ago, when the US Congress passed the DMCA, they introduced a couple of new 
provisions into the copyright law as an effort to keep up with the growing Internet community. 
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One of the provisions they added was the safe harbour provision, which would function as a 
protection to DSPs from copyright liability from their UGC. DSPs will not be held accountable 
for any of the copyright infringing materials uploaded by their users as long as they exercise 
the takedown action in their services. However, the provision appeared to be ambivalent 
because it does not require the DSPs to monitor the UGC (Lee E. , 2009, p. 3) nor to 
“affirmatively seeking facts indicating infringing activity,”9. Put differently, rights holders 
have to notify the DSPs individually in order for the takedown process to happen. In the end, 
the provision does not serve its purpose to govern the digital market, but it has become the 
most challenging legal issue in music streaming based on Mosumgaard’s response. 
 
Fast forward to the present, the safe harbour issue has stirred up huge media attention after 186 
artists (including Lady Gaga, U2, Taylor Swift and Sir Paul McCartney), songwriters, 
managers, labels, publishers, and CMOs signed a petition demanding DMCA to be reviewed 
(Ingham, 2016). It was the the first time “the entire industry is united and committed to 
pursuing a fair resolution”10 (Ingham, 2016), and it has definitely worked like a charm. In 2017, 
the European Commission officially identified the ‘value gap’ caused by the safe harbour 
provision as market distortion, and is drafting a new legislation “clarifying that services that 
engage with the content uploaded by users are liable for that content and need to be licensed” 
(IFPI, 2017, p. 27). The term ‘value gap’ first made its appearance in 2015 when it was 
mentioned in the IFPI report by their CEO, Frances Moore. She describes it as “a fundamental 
flaw in our industry’s landscape, which sees digital platforms such as Daily Motion and 
YouTube taking advantage of exemptions from copyright laws that simply should not apply to 
them” (IFPI, 2015, p. 5). Whilst safe harbour was initially drafted to provide shelter to DSPs 
for passive hosting, as the Internet grows and consumer behaviour evolves, most DSPs like 
YouTube have found a way to make profit from this loophole. So it is a worrisome matter for 
the entire music industry because everyone in the revenue chain is being affected. It would be 
interesting to find out how the EU directive would respond to the new legislation, and it 
certainly provides a glimpse of hope that copyright law could be improved at a faster tempo if 
the industry could work together as a collective. 
 
 
                                                   
9 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) 
10 This was an excerpt by Irving Azoff, chairman and CEO of Azoff MSG Entertainment.  
 46 
5.1.2 STANDARDIZATION & ‘ARTIFICIAL HOMONYM’  
 
When we speak about standardization, we are talking about making something conform to a 
standard, very much like the way a government assigns a specific dialect to become the official 
language of a nation, so that the people could understand each other no matter which part of 
the country they came from. Comparably, the music industry is in need of a standardization 
because everyone is speaking in a different business lingo. As I have mentioned before, 
‘common law’ and ‘civil law’ used terminology differently, hence there will have different 
interpretations on the same subject by various parties. For instance, ‘neighbouring right’ itself 
could be referred to as ‘sound recording right’, ‘author right’, or even ‘performing right’, 
depending on the given setting and situation (Cooke, 2015). Also, music streaming could be 
seen as a sale, a broadcast, or something entirely different, because the copyright law has not 
justified which rights are involved in music streaming. When there are no standard guidelines 
which people could use as references., confusion and miscommunication are destined to 
happen. In view of this phenomenon of having two or more meanings on the same terminology, 
I would refer it as ‘artificial homonym’.  
 
These ‘artificial homonyms’ could be eliminated easily if there was standardization being done 
across the copyright law. All the lawmakers need to do is clarify and create a standard on 
terminologies that are being used in the music industry. There should be explanation in detail 
on what each term entails regardless of which constitution it was applied on. Together, 
lawmakers could take the same opportunity to correct the ‘flexibility’ of copyright law and 
settle the argument of whether performer ER should be applicable in music streaming or not, 
once and for all.  
 
5.1.3 ALTERNATIVE BEYOND RECIPROCITY  
 
There is a common perception that cross-border royalty can only obtained through reciprocal 
agreements signed between CMOs and their overseas counterparts. But who would have 
guessed there is an alternative solution to bypass this restriction set by the copyright law? There 
was a visible decline in the FFUK funding since 2013, and the money they have received from 
GRAMO has decreased more than four million Norwegian crowns (approximately half a 
million USD) from 2014 to 2015. According to an anonymous representative from a CMO, 
some American artists have taken the matter into their own hands and found another solution 
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to retrieve their ‘American Money’. Instead of putting pressure on a settlement of reciprocity 
that could take years to happen, they have decided to join GRAMO and assign their rights to 
them separately. In this way, GRAMO has become their CMO officially and would have the 
right to collect their royalties on their behalf. This hassle-free solution has offered a quick fix 
to the American artists, and it is believed that more artists will take up this path to collect their 
royalties in Norway. 
 
Perhaps bypassing the reciprocal agreement could be argued as another form of system 
manipulation, but on paper, artists have every right to become a member of multiple CMOs as 
long as they satisfy the CMOs’ requirements. It is unavoidable that artists take extra measures 
to get their royalties. Otherwise, they will become another huge sum of ‘unallocated revenues’. 
If safe harbour is hindering the revenue stream, and rights holders are not getting paid as they 
should be for their copyrighted materials, maybe the lawmaker could look at the need for 
reciprocal agreements.  
  
5.1.4 TRANSPARENCY IN NDA 
 
In reality, “creators are owed some fiduciary level of care for the proceeds of their art” (Rethink 
Music, 2015, p. 25) especially in music streaming. Since the NDA has become the preferred 
choice in most digital deals (Cooke, 2015, p. 61), artists have been censored away from the 
access of information even though they are one of the main beneficiaries in the agreement. 
Among the information that has been hidden away from the artists, there are particulars about 
division of revenue, usage of advance, and even calculation on breakage. Without this 
knowledge in hand, being an artist in music streaming is just like being a glorified sweatshop 
worker, where the basic right to information of why and how one is being paid has been taken 
away. Besides that, there is a theory about record labels and publishers taking advantage of this 
exclusive arrangement to get hold of more money (Cooke, 2016, p. 67), which immediately 
triggers the red flag for the transparency and ‘black box’ issues that we have discussed earlier. 
 
Many questions have been raised in different roundtables (The Kristiansand Roundtable 
Conference, 2016; Cooke, 2015; Cooke, 2016) concerning how the NDA has reduced the 
transparency in the system, but no one has actually come up with a feasible solution. For those 
who defend the NDA, they claim the confidentiality clause may become unenforceable (Cooke, 
2015, p. 65) if every artist were able to demand for access. On top of that, there is the 
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competition law that they need be aware of (Cooke, 2016, p. 68), before they let loose of their 
negotiation power. In response to these conflicts, the European Commission has proposed the 
‘transparency obligation’ for rights holders in their newly drafted Article 14. The article 
emphasizes “Member States shall ensure that authors and performers receive on a regular basis 
and taking into account the specificities of each sector, timely, adequate and sufficient 
information on the exploitation of their works and performances” (Cooke, 2016, p. 67). 
Granted that this is an EU-initiated proposal, analysts are concerned that the ‘transparency 
obligation’ might not be as effective because it does not state clearly what is the “appropriate 
level of transparency” (Cooke, 2016, p. 68) being referred to in the article. Again, it might be 
left to the labels and publishers to interpret the true definition of ‘appropriate level’, which 
defeats the purpose of having this article in the first place. 
 
To establish a middle ground within the NDA and competition law, I support the idea of 
strengthening the right to information for creators, in lieu of letting the labels and publishers 
control what information they would like to let out. For example, the Rethink Music 
programme from the Berklee College of Music has proposed the ‘Creators Bill of Rights’, 
which highlights that “every creator deserves to know the entire payment stream for his/her 
royalties” (Rethink Music, 2015, p. 4). It resonates with the fundamental idea of the Freedom 
of Information (FOI) laws, which allows the public to exercise their ‘right-to-know’ 
(Chydenius, 2006, p. 4). Likewise, an artiste should be allowed to practise their ‘right-to-know’ 
to find out their revenue arrangement in the NDA through a government-monitored application. 
With the government as moderator, they can kill two birds with one stone, by neutralizing the 
risk of stepping over the competition law, and keep the transparency at an ‘appropriate level’. 
All of these initiatives are still at the proposing stage, and lawmakers have to keep in mind that 
the longer they take to resolve this issue, the more transparency issues will occur in the near 
future. 
 
5.2 GLOBAL REPERTOIRE REGISTRY 
 
It has been the goal of many CMOs to create a GRR, but unfortunately, none of them have 
managed to cross the finish line. Evidence shows that lack of funding was the main reason of 
failing for most of the GRR projects, but other sources also suggested that it might lie on the 
willingness to share information among rights holders and CMOs (Milosic, 2015). There is a 
potential risk where the GRR might take over the functionality of CMOs eventually, hence 
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some CMOs have become hesitant to contribute the data they have in hand (Milosic, 2015). 
Setting that aside, analysts like Smith is positive that legal barriers and political interest are the 
ultimate deal breakers in creating a GRR. Knowing there are differences between various 
constitutions in different countries, it is hard to pull together a GRR project that could satisfy 
the legal condition for all the nations. Moreover, setting up a more efficient database might do 
harm to some countries like the US, where more than 10 percent of their national economy is 
dependent on the copyright industry (Siwek, 2016). Entities such as the Harry Fox Agency play 
a crucial part in the copyright industry of the US, yet they also have a history of billing their 
clients without knowing whether they have the authority to license the copyrighted materials 
or not (Schwartz J. , 2003). So, to insure their lucrative copyright industry remains unharmed, 
it would be a better decision for for the US to stay away from any GRR related projects.  
 
While there are so many complications in the process of creating a GGR, “there remains a 
fairly wide consensus in the music business that a better system of rights ownership information 
management is crucial to the developing digital music industry” (Milosic, 2015). Other than 
making an accurate, reliable and accessible global music database, there is no better solution 
to eliminate the ‘unallocated revenues’. Having that in mind, several independent organisations 
such as FastTrack and MusicBrainz have continued the pursuit of a GRR, and reinvented the 
approach after learning from past experience. They are focusing on how to ensemble a 
decentralized system with numeric data instead of semantic data, and this new structure has 
won the approval from researchers and analysts. However, these clusters of data registries are 
still working separately in the meantime, so they will have similar underlying problems if they 
were to push forward to become an international joint venture. 
 
5.2.1 ‘BLACK BOX MONEY’ – AN ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF FUNDING  
    
According to the financial model of the GRD, the funding of a GRR could be divided into two 
main categories. First, the funds required for the initial setup, and second, the funds for the 
annual operating budget (Milosic, 2015). Generally, the capital of the project will mostly be 
financed by the participating CMOs that initiate the GRR, and it will be divided amongst 
themselves based on the size of the respective CMOs. On a rough estimate, each CMO that has 
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participated in the previous GRD must have contributed not lesser than €8 million11  into that 
project. Although it might be a manageable amount for bigger CMOs, it is a huge financial 
commitment for any CMO. Since all of the CMOs are non-profit organisations, their main 
source of revenue is solely derived from administration fees collected from their rights 
holders/members. After covering their employees’ payroll, the remaining proceeds will very 
likely be used to pay for other miscellaneous expenses like the electric bill, etc. Given this 
situation, most of them will have very little disposable income to spare, so it would be a very 
challenging task for them to support the GRR. Moreover, even if the CMOs  managed to pay 
for the first instalment, the GRR would still be left with a debt of more than USD$13 million 
(Milosic, 2015) after the project was shut down. Taking that into account, it is hard to imagine 
how much the CMOs should be anticipating for the next international joint venture GRR, and 
how to keep it afloat in the long run.  
 
In order to make the next GRR project less of a burden for any participating parties, CMOs 
must be able to tap into a sustainable source of funding. It should be something easy to access 
and in abundance, so they do not need to spend extra labour to collect them. Although it might 
be a little naïve to consider that such money will ever exist, I believe the ‘black box money’ 
might just have the answer for them. According to the statistics that I have collated, CMOs 
such as TONO have a potential yearly income of ‘unallocated revenues’ which would hover 
around USD $14 million12. Of course this is just an estimated projection, since most of these 
money will eventually be redistributed to other artists and the rest will be turned into a 
scholarship or cultural funding (Smith, 2011; Møller, 2016). However, considering there is no 
official guideline from CISAC on how to make use of these ‘unallocated revenues’, it would 
be a great idea to use part of them to fund the next GRR project. May it be a percentage out of 
the ‘unallocated revenues’ or a fix figure regardless of the total, it will still be a viable amount 
for the GRR. Most importantly, CMOs will never run out of these monies till the day they have 
created a fully functional GGR to resolve the data registry issue, so there is no reason for CMOs 
to pull out from the project due to financial difficulties.  
                                                   
11 The initial cost for the GRD was projected to be approximately €23 to 32 million and there 
were only four out of eight core members in the GRD are CMOs: Apple iTunes, Amazon, 
EMI, Nokia, PRS, SACEM, STIM and Universal Music Publishing. (Source: Isherwood, 
2011; Milosic, 2015)  
12 The potential ‘unallocated revenues’ for TONO from year 2010 to 2015 is about 100 
million to 150 million Norwegian crowns. 
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5.2.2 BLOCKCHAIN: MUSIC WITHOUT THE MIDDLEMEN  
 
Those who have some knowledge about the ‘black box’ must have heard of the blockchain – a 
fully realized system made to process digital transactions. It was the talk of the town in various 
roundtables and workshops, and a lot of people were very interested to adopt it in the digital 
music market. Its efficient data tracking property is believed to be able to create a decentralised 
database, where it could “automate the division and distribution of royalties”, and provide 
“speed, efficiency and transparency in the royalties distribution process” (Music Ally, 2016). 
Every piece of metadata in the system will be stored in its own metaphoric ‘block’ and 
connected with other related metadata or a bigger data pool via a ‘chain’. As the metadata of a 
music will always be represented in a collective of Blockchain, it could reveal “information 
travelling with any given digital track wherever and however it is being used” (Music Ally, 
2016, p. 1). When the required information of the music such as title, rights holders, revenue 
split, contract terms, related statute, etc were uploaded into the system, a normal digital 
transaction that would take time to process could be done in the matter of seconds by using 
blockchain (Rethink Music, 2015, p. 27). To illustrate how does this process due in a revenue 
stream, Rethink Music used iTunes download sale as an example: 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
[…] suppose a song is purchased from a digital music store, such as iTunes. 
After the store takes its cut, for ease of demonstration, we will 
hypothetically assume the revenue generated by the purchase comes to 
US$1.00. This money would be split between the two different works 
contained in the song, with a 9.1 cent mechanical royalty going to the 
musical work, and the remaining 90.9 cents going to the sound recording. 
Next, if the contract between the publisher and songwriter specifies a  
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In view of this fast and almost labour-less transaction, blockchain could serve as a “low-cost, 
low-barrier-to-entry music service for dissemination and consumption, based on what the 
listener wants” (Rethink Music, 2015, p. 2). Therefore, it will encourage a more user-centric 
payment model as opposed to the pro-rata model commonly used by the DSPs. Artists in turn 
will receive a fairer payment according to the number of times their tracks are being played, 
because there is no room for the ‘winner-take-all’ effect if blockchain is employed into the 
system. 
 
Even though blockchain offered a wide scope of benefits and checked all the boxes for being 
a great GRR candidate, Dr. Silver suggested it will need more than a decade for it to bring any 
significant impact to the music industry (Rethink Music, 2015, p. 3). It requires time to develop, 
collate data as well as resolve other legal matters before it could be fully integrated into music 
streaming. With that said, I remain optimistic that blockchain is a feasible solution for the data 
registry issue. If CMOs could join forces and iron out how to adopt it into the next GRR project, 
the future of music streaming will be more transparent and have more money for the artists.  
 
5.3 LABELS 
 
First and foremost, there are several questions that need to be clarified on the subject of the 
’black box’, and these questions can only be answered by the record labels. Being seen as the 
one that should be responsible for the low margin conspiracy in music steaming, labels have to 
75/25 split of revenue from downloads, the publisher would receive 6.825 
cents and the songwriter would receive 2.275 cents. 
 
With an identical split at the record label, the label would receive 
68.175 cents, and the recording artist would get 22.725 cents. The 
blockchain network could also further divide these 22.725 
cents between the members of a band, if applicable.  
 
This entire process would take place in less than one second, allowing all 
parties to access their money immediately after it is generated. (Rethink 
Music, 2015, pp. 27-28) 
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justify why ‘breakage’ is still in play in the digital age and how they came up with the figure 
that they are charging their artists. If risks from investing on the artists is the reason they are 
still applying ‘breakage’, then artists should be able to demand performer ER in exchange. In 
the diluted market of music streaming, not every artist will be able to break through to the 
crowd and have enough hits on their music to generate a revenue equivalent to the minimum 
monthly wage of USD $1,260. They too have a high level of risks to be shouldered if they were 
committed to become full-time recording artists. Furthermore, it would be a double-standard if 
labels could casually decide which terms should be applied onto music streaming, since there 
was not written statement in the copyright law dictating how ‘breakages’ and performer ER 
should be applied in music streaming. So, if the labels are determined to dismiss performer ER 
in music streaming, it is only fair for them to drop ‘breakage’ in music streaming as well.  
 
Record labels also have to explain why the ‘unallocated advances’ are not being shared with 
their artists. Even though two of the majors, Warner Music and Sony Music, have promised to 
share these monies with their artists, to date, “there has been very little detail about any of these 
commitments” (Cooke, 2016, p. 58). As stressed by most of the artists and managers, “the devil 
is in the detail” (Cooke, 2016, p. 58) Little information has been given by the labels in regards 
to when and how the actual implementation will take place. Rather than an act of goodwill, this 
empty promise risks being seen as a PR stunt to fool their artists. As long as these foul practices 
remain unexplained, we will never get to create solutions to reduce these ‘black box monies’.  
 
5.4 PUBLISHERS 
 
No more ‘rights ready’ (Cooke, 2015, p. 10) in music streaming means the status of publishers 
will not be the same anymore. They are less significant in comparison to record labels because 
DSPs usually conduct their deal negotiation starting with labels first rather than the publishers. 
After DSPs have “committed up to 60% of its revenues to those who control the recording 
rights” (Cooke, 2016, p. 32), publishers will have to settle with a smaller cut or initiate another 
round of negotiation with labels privately to ask them for a discount from their share. Being 
the latter party to enter the digital deal negotiation, publishers are being placed in a subordinate 
position. 
 
One solution being floated during the MMF roundtable was a suggestion to adopt a model more 
akin to physical distribution. In other words, publishers should issue their licenses directly to 
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record labels and fabricate ‘rights ready’ contents for DSPs. In this manner, publishers would 
get to negotiate with the labels and prevent any biased arrangement that will normally be done 
secretly in NDAs. In addition, it will also minimize the differences of the artists’ payout, 
‘breakage’ and ‘unallocated advances’ because every single term and condition in the deal has 
to be agreed on by both parties before it is submitted to DSPs. This ‘rights ready’ licensing 
model is commonly known as ‘pass through licensing’ (Cooke, 2016, p. 32) and has been used 
in digital downloads in the US and some other emerging markets. The fact that record labels 
might not honour any arrangement that would temper their power and revenue stream, 
publishers are in doubt that this model will ever work out in music streaming. But on a brighter 
note, if publishers could follow this in the future, record labels might be less aggressive and it 
will be easier to discuss and resolve the ‘black box’ issue with them. 
 
5.5 COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS    
Along with the aim to crystallize a functional GRR, there are some other things that CMOs 
could work to increase the awareness of the ‘black box’ issue in the music industry. Many 
artists and managers clearly lack the knowledge in relation to their rights and the whereabouts 
of their royalties. More than half of the artist managers at the MMF roundtable were completely 
clueless on the revenue share arrangement and minimum payments of their artists (Cooke, 
2015, p. 49). Dissecting artist contracts and revenue stream in the digital marketing could be 
really overwhelming for any budding artist and manager. Even for the more experienced ones, 
it is still hard for them to grasp the do’s and don’ts because copyright law is too flexible, and 
music streaming is still evolving. Thus, it is hard to predict which would be the right decision 
for them. Perhaps CMOs could initiate some educational programmes to better equip these 
artists and managers with the necessary information to help them navigate the complicated 
music streaming industry. It could be done through workshops or festivals, where artists and 
managers could ask some specific case-to-case questions, or via the internet to make the 
information available to everyone. When artists and managers are more informed, they can 
articulate themselves better in contract negotiation and avoid becoming the next ‘black box’ 
victim.  
 
Also, CMOs have to be more open with their rights holders/members that there is ‘black box 
money’ circulating in their systems. From what I have learnt, most artists do not know their 
CMOs are keeping a share of the ‘black box money’, or that they might be benefiting from it. 
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A quick glance through the financial reports of TONO reveals no clear indication of which part 
of the money is ‘unallocatable’ and when that sum of money will be converted to a scholarship 
or cultural funding. While every single strand of ‘unallocated revenue’ has a three-year expiry 
period before they could be repurposed, it is very hard to reflect the progress of each individual 
transaction on the financial report. Royalties that are being branded as ‘unallocatable’ have 
various levels of problems in their data. Therefore, each and every one of them will have a 
different timeline before the CMO could decide where it should be transferred to next. 
Capturing this spontaneous yet massive pool of money into a single account is impossible, and 
even if it is, it will not be entirely accurate. Combining these complications, CMOs like TONO 
will be unable to record ‘unallocated revenues’ into their financial report. There might be a hint 
of secrecy for them to censor this away from their rights holders/members, as it could affect 
their performance and image as a good efficient CMO. However, not being clear and 
transparent to their rights holder/members might bring them other consequences too. I was told 
by an anonymous representative from a CMO, that a couple of organisations have stopped 
applying for cultural funding after they found out the money they had received previously was 
generated from ‘unallocated revenues’. I believe this backlash was not an outcome that the 
CMO would be expecting. It shows that rights holders have a higher respect for transparency 
over getting some extra cash from royalties that do not belong to them.  
 
Evidently, the recognition of ‘black box money’ within CMOs are not as pronounce in 
comparison to those who have been taken by record labels. Therefore, the focus of the ‘black 
box’ debate by artists primarily centres around the labels and the system. If artists could be 
educated more comprehensively on the ‘black box’ issue, they would be able to understand the 
importance of having a GRR and be more diligent in registering their music. As a result, they 
could play their part in correcting the data registry problems, starting from reporting the use of 
their music and keeping track of any changes in the particulars of the rights holders. 
  
5.6 DIGITAL SERVICE PROVIDERS   
When music distribution marched into the streaming realm, consumers no longer paid for every 
single track. Instead, they are paying a monthly subscription fee to access the music provided 
by their DPSs. As the consumption method has evolved, DSPs have to make corresponding 
changes on their revenue allocation model. The new model that has been adopted into most 
DSPs is called the pro-rata, or ‘proportionate allocation’ (Maasø, 2014, p. 4). It promotes top-
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heavy ‘quantitative listening’ where the more the music is being listened to, the higher revenues 
the corresponding rights holders will receive. In that sense, smaller artists with niche audience 
will have a harder time to generate an income that is close to their superstar counterparts, and 
music streaming is not as sustainable for them as the media would have portrayed. 
 
To turn the tide around, Maasø (2014) suggests employing another model called the user-
centric model, which would give all artists a fairer deal. This model disregards “how much 
each user streamed, but how much each user paid” (Maasø, 2014, p. 5). As opposed to 
‘quantitative listening’, user-centric models focus on the true value of each stream. For 
example, if a consumer is paying USD $10 for his/her monthly subscription and he/she only 
listened to one song that month, the true value of that stream will worth USD $10. In contrary, 
if that consumer is a heavy user and streamed up to one thousand tracks in one month, each 
song will only worth USD $0.01. Under this scenario, artists who have a small but dedicated 
audience will get to receive a higher payout from DSPs, because they will be receiving the true 
value of their songs, as determined by the consumers.  
 
Without a doubt, a user-centric model will indeed create a fairer revenue allocating system in 
music streaming, but to implement it will require the support of some other key players. From 
a diehard consumer’s point-of-view, the money that consumers have spent should be 
channelled to the artists that they have patronized. But for record labels, in particular the 
majors, it does not really matter, because changing from a pro-rata to a user-centric model has 
very little impact on their share of revenue. As a matter of fact, the majors will lose one 
percentage point as a whole if they opted for a user-centric model (Maasø, 2014, p. 6). In view 
of that, ‘fairness’ seems to be a less affirmative reason for DSPs to persuade record labels to 
charge their settlement model. However, if DSPs could successfully convince the labels in the 
future, they might be able to mend the low margin issues that average 
 artists are encountering. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Daniel Ek (2016) says: “music is growing again, streaming is behind the growth in music”, but 
in my opinion it is one step forward, two steps back. Whilst trying to answer my research 
questions, I found that music streaming has caused a lot of problems in the core of the music 
industry. Granted, it has cultivated music buyers among consumers who have developed an 
appetite for free music, and boosted the sales of music after the long recession. But it has also 
heightened the flaws in the system that was governing the music industry.  
 
To begin with, music streaming is constantly challenging the copyright law. A statute that was 
built to police the trades of intellectual property has failed to recognise what is a stream, and 
how to fit it into their rules and regulations. It is not a sale, nor a broadcast, and not exactly a 
rental. It is a stream which consumers can only access it when they have the internet, and they 
do not get to keep the music. To describe music streaming and make it really clear is a feat, 
because in the dictionary of copyright law, there is no clear definition for it just yet. Hence, 
corporate rights holders have been exploiting its weaknesses to make extra money by “twisting 
the rules” or “playing the system” (Cooke, 2015, p. 22). Analysts and researchers refer to these 
copyright-related issues as loopholes in the system, but I would rather call them blind spots. 
Lawmakers have to realise that music streaming is one of its kind, and copyright law is not 
one-size-fits-all.  
 
What comes after a failed copyright law is a dysfunctional system in music streaming. Yes, 
music streaming is making money every year, but the wealth in the industry does not penetrate 
into the core where artists, authors and creators reside. All the missing revenue has been trapped 
inside the ‘black box’, and I can see no virtue in a system that allows unpaid labour and calls 
it a saviour of the industry. Evidently, ‘black box money’ is found in entities such as record 
labels, publishers, and CMOs. Due to the introduction of music streaming, the revenue 
allocation model, contracts and agreements have to evolve correspondingly. They have 
morphed into something more complicated and less transparent. A pro-rata system makes the 
rich richer and the poor poorer; NDAs are turning artists and creators into sweatshop workers; 
and, the lack of a GRR has turned many artists into generous donors to support other artists 
and funding without their will. As Vickie Nauman (2016) puts it, the music industry has 
transformed into a “high complexity, low margin” industry. 
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I have mentioned before, that the ‘black box’ is just the destination of the ‘unallocated 
revenues’, ‘unallocated advances’, and ‘breakage’. People might know of its existence but few 
will talk about it (Lindvall, 2008), since it involves personal, business, and political interests. 
When I was doing my research, it was like navigating a journey without a map or GPS. I have 
to dig deep and keep asking, and I do not always receive an answer. Nonetheless, the difficulties 
of this research has increased my interest on the topic immensely, and whenever I unearth some 
information that I have not learnt before, I feel like I have struck gold.  
 
To sum up my thesis, I hope I have achieved the goal of showing how the growth of music 
streaming has affected the revenue of artists, and offered a clearer insight into where the 
missing revenue has gone. Since music streaming is a growing business, I am certain that more 
research could be done to solve the ‘black box’ problem. I wish my analysis on the ‘black box’ 
and suggestion on solutions will evoke more discussion, and the respective entities and 
lawmakers will eventually look into this issue more seriously. Lastly, I urge those who are 
reading my thesis to share your thoughts about the ‘black box’ with your peers and keep the 
conversation going. Because the first step to a more sustainable music streaming industry is to 
make the problems known to all. Like what Earl Nightingale would say, “Whenever we're 
afraid, it's because we don't know enough. If we understood enough, we would never be afraid.” 
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7.4 GRAMO – FFUK  
 
 
7.5 QUESTIONNAIRE ANSWERS 
 
 
Niels Mosumgaard = NM  Erica Smith = SM  Jim Griffin = JM  
 
Q1.  The music industry has not clearly defined whether a stream should be considered 
as a sale, a broadcast or something else entirely. What is your interpretation on that? 
 
NM: That it is still an immature technology and that the understanding of it sticks to what we 
know. It is a sale, a broadcast and something else but no matter what it is it should be a business 
model for all.  
 
ES: Broadcast 
 
JG: It is neither broadcast nor sale. It is something else entirely. It is certainly not the sale of 
property. 
 
 
Q2.  We have seen some old business practices in physical distribution being carried over 
to music streaming, and some argue that previous practices such as 'break-even'13 should 
not be applicable to music streaming since streams are not tangible items. Do you agree 
with this argument and why? 
 
NM: No. There is still money involved in making, producing, recording and distributing music 
and this money has to be covered - so the business model between different partners is still the 
same. Unless you risk your own money. 
                                                   
13 ‘Break-even’ is another term for ‘breakage’. 
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010
Outstanding	tax	(included	also	in	trade)
Outstanding	at	01/01/201X 7	977	530	 4	909	313	 3	234	444	 6	498	149	 6	828	520	 7	485	225	
Invoiced 37	146	832	 41	376	413	 40	472	868	 40	328	135	 41	499	826	 40	100	165	
Retained	FFUK -37	568	108	 -37	546	116	 -37	840	749	 -42	847	245	 -41	319	930	 -39	810	572
Irrecoverable	 -525	559	 -762	080	 -957	250	 -744	595	 -510	267	 -946	298
Outstanding	by	31.12.201X 7	030	695	 7	977	530	 4	909	313	 3	234	444	 6	498	149	 6	828	520	
Proceeds	not	transferred	to	FFUK	by	31.12.201X 4	957	667	 3	244	310	 2	313	783	 724	539	 2	817	951	 4	395	374	
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ES: I think the carry over of traditional trade practices to be deliberately dishonest. I am not 
sure if you mean "break even" or "breakage" but certainly in the case of breakage this is non-
sensical.  I do however believe that there are legitimate practices which are specific to digital 
distribution that can be applied but companies need to accept that the business models have to 
change rather than trying to hold on to old practices. 
 
JG: Streams are not tangible items. The parties to these contracts should act accordingly 
without pretending the new world of services is the old world of products. 
 
 
Q3: Are there any other practices that you think should or should not be used in music 
streaming? 
 
NM: *interviewee skipped this question 
 
ES: I think the question of whether a stream touches on both "communication to the public" 
and the "reproduction right" should be resolved. As should the issue of the making available 
right and the right of performers to remuneration. 
 
JG: I am open-minded and accept the practices to which parties agree as representative of their 
agreement. 
 
 
Q4. In recent years, record companies have seen a significant decrease in their global 
turnover whilst most of the Collective Management Organisations (CMOs)/collecting 
societies were in the contrary. Is this true from your personal experience? 
 
NM: Yes, it has been so for some years now, but it seems somehow that the record companies 
are coming back. 
 
ES: No. For the larger CMOs at least there is growth. If you look at the CISAC Global report 
you will see evidence of this growth worldwide. However, I suspect that smaller CMOs may 
face real challenges. 
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JG: Yes, of course. Collective licensing is the past, present and future. 
 
 
Q5: Several experts claim that if metadata were to be coordinated, the music industry as 
a whole could save billions of dollars yearly. That being said, none of the attempts at 
creating a Global Repertoire Registry (e.g: GRD, IMR) were successful. If you were given 
the opportunity to take up another campaign to setup a GRR, what would your main 
objectives be, and would you go for a different approach? 
 
NM: There is a decentralized initiative Fast-track on the way with access to the databases of 
the societies. This is a way forward, and I think that the ISWC and ISRC code should be linked 
in the same way. 
 
ES: I agree that there is a need for a Global Repertoire. I would start by trying to at least agree 
standards and have regional registries developed first before a full global initiative. One of the 
major issues concerns ownership and control and in this regard, the CISAC members should 
all have an equal interest but a third party should have oversight. Unfortunately, I think 
politically this is probably an impossible venture. 
 
JG: These attempts are evolving. They proved the need if not the path forward. I remain 
convinced the DNS system for the internet is the right model. 
 
 
Q6: Due to the nature of the copyright law in some territories, a rights holder does not 
necessarily have to be the creator. Many believe that rights holders and other 
stakeholders are trying to manipulate the system in order to reduce payment to the 
creators. What is your take on the existing copyright law and what are the improvements 
that you would like to see in the near future? 
 
NM: I don't see a general conflict between publishers and creators in this respect. There is no 
doubt that publishers are doing a good job on behalf of creators who cannot handle both the 
creation of music and selling it at the same time. But as in any business transparency and the 
ability to renegotiate the contracts would be good. Unfortunately, we see a turn from collective 
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to individual negotiation on agreements and that is a wrong way forward. The most challenging 
legal issue is to get service providers like YouTube and Soundcloud out of the safe harbour. 
 
ES: There have always been nefarious practices by record companies and music publishers. I 
think the issue has worsened now with the addition of platforms such as YouTube etc. 
 
JG: The black box system does reduce pass-through to creators and, yes, the status quo clings 
to these pools of unattributed revenue. 
 
 
Q7: In a situation where there is a sum of unallocated revenues circulating in one’s 
establishment, what is your best suggestion to relocate this money as fair as possible? 
 
NM: To make better meta data available and if it is impossible to find the right rights holder 
to recycle it into the cash flow. 
 
ES: Most should be placed back in distribution pools but it is reasonable to apply some for 
cultural and developmental activities once there is transparency. 
 
JG: Actuarial analysis replaces actual control where the latter proves impractical or inefficient. 
 
 
Q7: In a situation where there is a sum of unallocated revenues circulating in one’s 
establishment, what is your best suggestion to relocate this money as fair as possible? 
 
NM  ES  JG   
✔  ✔  ✔  Record labels 
    ✔  Publishers 
  ✔    Collective management societies (CMOs) 
      Consumers (piracy) 
✔      Digital Service Providers (DSPs) e.g: Spotify, Apple 
✔      Platform services e.g: Google, Facebook, Soundcloud etc. 
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